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Abstract
Part I of this Note provides an overview of Internet censorship and international law, including
the different approaches and theories behind Internet censorship. Part I.A discusses the develop-
ment of the ICCPR and its application to the Internet. Next, Part I.B-D provides an in-depth
overview of the Internet censorship models of three different countries: the United States, the
United Kingdom, and China. Part II examines each country’s Internet censorship model under
Article 19 of the ICCPR, considering Article 19(3)’s three-part test and requirements established
by recent UN reports interpreting them. The analysis will also examine each country’s copyright
laws under Article 19. In Part III, this Note argues that due to the idiosyncrasies of each country’s
Internet censorship policy and new challenges presented by intellectual property laws, Article 19
of the ICCPR by itself does not provide a clear analysis of a country’s Internet policy. Article 19
should be supplemented with parts of Professor Bambauer’s framework. The culturally-neutral
criterion of the framework mitigates the difficulty of analyzing and comparing countries with dif-
ferent cultural norms and moral values. Moreover, the proposed metric also allows for analysis
of indirect chilling effects caused by intellectual property laws. This Note concludes that supple-
menting Article 19 with the framework proposed by Professor Bambauer is a positive step towards
creating a global standard of Internet regulation.
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Every day, a courier begins his route and enters a busy and 
seemingly endless highway. As he drives, he observes different 
passing exits. Some exits are patrolled by watchdogs, while towers 
and formidable walls loom over others. As he enters different exits, 
he is stopped and examined by each post differently. Some let him 
pass through freely, some cautiously examine him, and others turn 
him around without any explanation. This occurs billions of times a 
day. This is the Internet.  
Few if any developments in information technology have had 
such an effect on society as the creation of the Internet.1 Moreover, 
the advent of Internet social media in particular has provided users 
with an unprecedented level of communication.2 The expansive reach 
of social media has played a key role, for example, in coordinating 
mass protests and keeping the international community informed 
about situations where journalists have limited access.3 Recognizing 
                                                            
1 See, e.g., Mike Lata, How the Internet Revolutionized Human Interactivity, EXAMINER 
(Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.examiner.com/article/how-the-Internet-revolutionized-human-
interactivity (describing the Internet’s influence on human interaction); Courtney Myers, How 
the Internet is Revolutionizing Education, THE NEXT WEB (May 14, 2011), http://
thenextweb.com/insider/2011/05/14/how-the-Internet-is-revolutionizing-education/ (describing 
how the Internet has shifted education paradigms). 
2. See Karan Chopra, The Effects of Social Media on How We Speak and Write, SOCIAL 
MEDIA TODAY (Sept. 17, 2103), http://socialmediatoday.com/karenn1617/1745751/effects-
social-media-how-we-speak-and-write (describing how the Internet has not only shaped the 
way people communicate, but has also transformed our concept of communicating); Lata, 
supra note 1 (noting that the unprecedented, global reach of the Internet has spurred 
government intervention). 
3. See, e.g., Mercedes Bunz, In Haiti Earthquake Coverage, Social Media Gives Victim a 
Voice, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/media/pda/2010/jan/14/
socialnetworking-haiti (discussing how social media has played a pivotal role in news 
reporting during periods of traditional media blackouts); Sam Gustin, Social Media Sparked, 
Accelerated Egypt’s Revolutionary Fire, WIRED (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.wired.com/2011/
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the significance of the Internet as an avenue for expression, scholars 
and UN specialists posit that Article 19 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) implies a right to Internet 
access.4 The ICCPR is a multilateral treaty that commits its State 
party members to respect specific civil and political rights of 
individuals.5 Article 19 of the ICCPR (“Article 19”) establishes a 
qualified right to freedom of expression.6 However, the expansion of 
this sixty-year-old international treaty to the Internet comes with 
certain difficulties.7 
The border-defying aspects of the Internet raise an international 
governance problem on a global scale.8 Countries are exercising 
increased control over internal Internet activity, specifically through 
the use of censorship.9 Censorship occurs when a government body 
directly or indirectly prevents communication between a willing 
speaker and a willing listener through regulations or control.10 
Moreover, governments justify their restrictions based on a variety of 
norms.11 For example, China justifies its extensive Internet 
restrictions for the purposes of maintaining social stability and 
                                                                                                                                     
02/egypts-revolutionary-fire/ (reporting social media’s significant influence on the Egyptian 
Revolution of 2011).  
4. See infra Part I.A.1 (discussing scholars’ interpretations of Article 19 to imply a right 
to Internet access). 
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
6. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 19. 
7. See infra Part II (examining the selected country’s model of Internet governance under 
Article 19); infra Part III (arguing that Article 19 is insufficient to deal with the current 
systems of Internet censorship). 
8. See infra Part I.B-D (describing several countries’ different Internet censorship 
models). 
9. See infra Part I.B-D (discussing attempts of government regulations of the Internet in 
selected countries). 
10. For the purposes of this Note, censorship also includes government regulations that 
create indirect chilling effects. In his article, Orwell’s Armchair, Professor Derek E. Bambauer 
defines censorship as government interdiction that prevents communication between a willing 
speaker and a willing listener. See Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 
863, 871 (2012) [hereinafter Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair]. However, this definition is too 
narrow. Prior restraints or prospects of subsequent punishment can also regulate citizens’ 
behavior. See generally, William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: 
Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 
67 CORNELL L. REV. 245 (1982) (discussing how prior restraint and subsequent punishment 
also suppress speech). 
11. See infra Part I.B-D (explaining different countries’ justification for their Internet 
censorship). 
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national security.12 The United States, on the other hand, permits 
much more content because the First Amendment provides 
constitutional protections for free speech.13  
Additionally, the current system of digital copyright laws 
adopted by many countries, such as the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act and E-Commerce Directive, presents potential complications 
under the rights guaranteed by Article 19.14 As a consequence, the 
combination of the limited text of Article 19 of the ICCPR, the range 
of censorship and idiosyncratic Internet regulations and intellectual 
property laws, and the divergence in transnational norms makes it 
difficult to analyze the legitimacy of a specific country’s Internet 
censorship policy.15  
Further, countries have employed different methods of 
protecting copyrights in the digital world.16 Scholars have criticized 
certain national copyright laws, specifically intermediary liability and 
notice-and-action systems, for their potential chilling effect on 
speech.17 In response, advocacy organizations, such as the UK-based 
ARTICLE 19, have recommended changes to the current paradigm of 
notice-and-action systems in order to limit collateral negative 
effects.18  
With visions of creating a uniformly regulated Internet, some 
theorists argue for an international approach to Internet regulation.19 
                                                            
12. See infra Part I.D (discussing the People’s Republic of China’s (“PRC’s”) Internet 
censorship model). 
13. See infra Part I.B (describing the US Constitution and its Internet censorship model). 
14. See infra Part I.B-C (discussing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) 
and E-Commerce Directive’s impact on internet speech). 
15. See infra Part III (arguing that Article 19 does not effectively address the various 
novel issues presented by the Internet). 
16. See infra Part I.B-D (discussing various countries’ approaches to protecting digital 
copyrights). 
17. Governments impose intermediary liability by making communication 
intermediaries, such as content providers (e.g., YouTube), legally liable for the actions of its 
users. Notice-and-action is a process, generally established by a statute or court order, of 
removing content after receiving certain notice. See Internet Intermediaries: Dilemma of 
Liability, ARTICLE 19, http://www.article19.org/data/files/Intermediaries_ENGLISH.pdf 
(2013) [hereinafter Internet Intermediaries] (advocating for a change to the current notice-and-
action regimes); see also Unintended Consequences: Fifteen Years Under the DMCA, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 2013), https://www.eff.org/pages/unintended-
consequences-fifteen-years-under-dmca (discussing the DMCA’s effect on Internet speech). 
18. See Internet Intermediaries, supra note 17 (recommending improvements on the 
notice-and-action systems). 
19. See, e.g., Elaine M. Chen, Global Internet Freedom: Can Censorship and Freedom 
Coexist?, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 229, 232 (2003) (arguing that Internet 
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Others argue that, while a global uniform censorship policy is 
attractive, it is not viable.20 In an attempt to address the deficiency in 
current theoretical approaches to Internet governance, Professor 
Derek E. Bambauer presented a process-based metric for analyzing 
Internet regulatory systems.21 The metric examines the openness, 
transparency, narrowness, and accountability of a country’s 
censorship scheme.22 While Professor Bambauer developed the metric 
to be used in analyzing countries’ censorship systems, he did not 
address its potential application to Article 19.23 This Note argues for 
supplementing a similar normative metric to Article 19 of the ICCPR. 
Such a metric would provide clearer guidelines for analyzing the 
legitimacy of national censorship laws as measured against the 
potential indirect chilling effects caused by such laws. 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of Internet censorship 
and international law, including the different approaches and theories 
behind Internet censorship. Part I.A discusses the development of the 
ICCPR and its application to the Internet. Next, Part I.B-D provides 
an in-depth overview of the Internet censorship models of three 
different countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
China.  
Part II examines each country’s Internet censorship model under 
Article 19 of the ICCPR, considering Article 19(3)’s three-part test 
and requirements established by recent UN reports interpreting them. 
                                                                                                                                     
censorship should be left to an international arena, such as the United Nations); Nart 
Villeneuve, Barriers to Cooperation: An Analysis of the Origins of International Efforts to 
Protect Children Online, in ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER, RIGHTS, AND 
RULE IN CYBERSPACE 55, 63-66 (Ronald J. Deibert et al. eds., 2010) (arguing for reciprocal 
participation of governments and ISPs to remove illegal content). 
20. See, e.g., Renee Keen, Untangling the Web: Exploring Internet Regulation Schemes 
in Western Democracies, 13 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 351, 369-70 (arguing that an international 
approach is not feasible because of the divergence of obscenity standards). 
21. Professor Derek E. Bambauer is a Professor of Law at University of Arizona, James 
E. Rogers College of Law. See Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377 (2009) 
[hereinafter Bambauer, Cybersieves] (presenting a process-based metric of openness, 
transparency, narrowness and accountability for analyzing a country’s Internet regulatory 
scheme). 
22. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 390 (presenting the framework); see 
also Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 900-06 (utilizing the framework to 
analyze attempts of soft-censorship in the United States). 
23. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 410-18 (arguing for various forms of 
implementing the framework, but not considering the Human Rights Commission as a viable 
option or the framework’s relevance to Article 19 of the ICCPR).  
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The analysis will also examine each country’s copyright laws under 
Article 19. 
In Part III, this Note argues that due to the idiosyncrasies of each 
country’s Internet censorship policy and new challenges presented by 
intellectual property laws, Article 19 of the ICCPR by itself does not 
provide a clear analysis of a country’s Internet policy. Article 19 
should be supplemented with parts of Professor Bambauer’s 
framework.24 The culturally-neutral criterion of the framework 
mitigates the difficulty of analyzing and comparing countries with 
different cultural norms and moral values. Moreover, the proposed 
metric also allows for analysis of indirect chilling effects caused by 
intellectual property laws. This Note concludes that supplementing 
Article 19 with the framework proposed by Professor Bambauer is a 
positive step towards creating a global standard of Internet regulation. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW AND THE INTERNET  
In this Part, Section A will discuss the historical development of 
the ICCPR and its subsequent application to the Internet. Next, 
Section B provides an in-depth overview of the Internet censorship 
models of the United States, the United Kingdom, and China. These 
countries were selected because each country employs a distinct 
model of Internet governance. 
A. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
In 1948, the UN Commission on Human Rights drafted The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”).25 The UDHR set 
out thirty articles articulating human rights principles and established 
the framework for subsequent human rights treatises, such as the 
ICCPR.26 After nearly two decades of drafting, the ICCPR went into 
                                                            
24. See infra Part III (arguing that an Article 19 analysis should be supplemented by a 
similar process-based metric).  
25. See History of the Document, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUM. RTS., http://
www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (providing the 
history of the UDHR) [hereinafter The International Declaration of Human Rights]; SCOTT 
CARLSON & GREGORY GISVOLD, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON 
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 1-2 (2003) (providing the background of the UDHR). 
26. See Carlson, supra note 25, at 1-2 (providing overview of the ICCPR and UDHR); 
see also THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUM. RTS., supra note 25.  
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effect in 1976.27 The ICCPR requires the signatory State parties to 
uphold the civil and political rights of individuals, including freedom 
of religion, speech, assembly, and electoral rights.28 Currently there 
are over 160 State Parties, including the United States and the United 
Kingdom.29 While China is a signatory of the ICCPR, it has not 
ratified the treaty.30 
The ICCPR contains two Optional Protocols.31 The Optional 
Protocols are additional sets of rules and procedures to the ICCPR 
that require separate ratification by a State Party in order to be in 
effect.32 In 1976, the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR provided 
an avenue for individuals who claim to have suffered a violation of an 
ICCPR provision to submit complaints to the HRC, granted that the 
complainant exhausted available domestic remedies.33 As of April 
2014, only 115 parties to the Covenant had adopted the First Optional 
Protocol.34  
The Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) is the UN-designated 
body responsible for writing reports about a State’s compliance with 
                                                            
27. See Carlson, supra note 25, at 2 (discussing the history of the ICCPR); The 
Foundation of International Human Rights Law, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/
documents/udhr/hr_law.shtml (last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (providing the history of ICCPR). 
28. See ICCPR, supra note 5.  
29. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en (last updated Jan. 4, 2014) (noting that there are 168 parties to the 
ICCPR) [hereinafter ICCPR Parties]. 
30. See ICCPR Parties, supra note 29 (showing that China has not ratified the treaty); 
China, CENTER FOR CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, http://www.ccprcentre.org/country/china/ 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (noting that China is not a Party to the ICCPR). 
31. There are two Optional Protocols to the ICCPR. The First Optional Protocol is 
relevant to this Note, and the Second Optional Protocol involves the abolition of the death 
penalty. See Carlson, supra note 26, at 2 (providing an overview of the two optional protocols 
to the ICCPR); Human Rights Explained: Fact Sheet 5: The International Bill of Rights, 
AUSTRALIAN HUM. RTS. COMMISSION (2009), https://www.humanrights.gov.au/human-rights-
explained-fact-sheet-5the-international-bill-rights (discussing the Optional Protocols) 
[hereinafter ICCPR Fact Sheet 5]. 
32. See Carlson, supra note 25, at 2 (discussing the Optional Protocols); ICCPR Fact 
Sheet 5, supra note 31 (explaining how the optional protocols supplement the ICCPR with 
additional obligations to adopting State Parties). 
33. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 
16, 1966, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPCCPR1.aspx 
[hereinafter First Optional Protocol] (establishing the individual communication procedure). 
34. The United Kingdom, People’s Republic of China, and the United States have not 
adopted the First Optional Protocol. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTIONS , https://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4&lang=en (last updated 
Jan. 4, 2014) (listing only 115 parties to the first optional protocol). 
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the ICCPR.35 The HRC is not a UN organization per se, but rather an 
independent expert committee comprised of delegates from State 
Parties.36 Utilizing three procedural mechanisms—namely state 
reporting, individual complaints, and inter-state complaints, the HRC 
is responsible for examining a member State’s compliance with the 
ICCPR obligations.37  
As part of the State reporting mechanism, State Parties must 
submit initial and subsequent periodic reports to inform the HRC 
about measures undertaken to implement and comply with the 
ICCPR.38 The HRC examines these State reports during regularly 
scheduled sessions and then issues a Concluding Observation, which 
includes positive observations and concerns regarding State Parties’ 
compliance with the ICCPR.39 The HRC also encourages compliance 
with the Covenant by examining specific complaints under the First 
Optional Protocol.40 If a violation is found, the HRC may suggest an 
appropriate remedy.41 Similar to Concluding Observations, decisions 
issued by the HRC serve as specific, authoritative interpretations of 
the ICCPR.42 It is important to note that the HRC is neither a court 
                                                            
35. See Carlson, supra note 25, at 2-4 (explaining the role and duties of the HRC); 
Monitoring Civil and Political Rights, UN HUM. RTS. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
CCPR/Pages/CCPRIntro.aspx (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (describing the role of the Human 
Rights Committee). 
36. Although they share similar names and terminology, the HRC is not the same as the 
Committee on Human Rights, nor is it part of the Office of the High Commission for Human 
Rights. See Carlson, supra note 25, at 2-4.  
37. ICCPR, supra note 5; see Carlson, supra note 26, at 2-13 (explaining each 
procedural mechanism). 
38. ICCPR, supra note 5. 
39. See Carlson, supra note 26 at 8-9 (discussing Concluding Observations); UN Human 
Rights Committee Issues Concluding Observations on State Reports on Chad, Kyrgyzstan, 
Latvia, Nepal, Sierra Leone, and the United States, INT'L JUST. RESOURCE CENTER (Apr. 3, 
2014), http://www.ijrcenter.org/2014/04/03/un-human-rights-committee-issues-concluding-
observations-on-state-reports-of-chad-kyrgyzstan-latvia-nepal-sierra-leone-and-the-united-
states-of-america/ (summarizing the Concluding Observations from the 110th HRC session). 
40. See First Optional Protocol, supra note 33; Carlson, supra note 25, at 9-12 
(providing an overview of the First Optional Protocol). 
41. See First Optional Protocol, supra note 33 (establishing the framework for State 
Party member’s remedial statements to the HRC). 
42. See Carlson, supra note 25, at 11 (stating that similar to the Concluding Observations 
on state reports, HRC decisions offer specific, authoritative interpretation of the ICCPR); 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies – Individual Communications, UN HUM. RTS., http://
www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/IndividualCommunications.aspx (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Individual Communications] (“The Committees’ decisions 
represent an authoritative interpretation of the treaty concerned.”). 
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nor does it possess the executive capacity to enforce the ICCPR.43 
Rather, decisions are used to apply international pressure to a State 
Party not in compliance.44  
1. The Expansion of the ICCPR to the Internet 
Article 19 of the ICCPR secures the right to expression and 
opinion free from external repression.45 It states:  
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without 
interference.  
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; 
this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or 
through any other media of his choice.  
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of 
this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. 
It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these 
shall only be such as are provided by law and are 
necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of 
others; (b) For the protection of national security or of 
public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.46  
Until recently, international human rights law concerning the 
Internet was sparse.47 For instance, there is no mention of the Internet, 
even in passing, in the HRC 2009–2010 report.48 Article 19 of the 
                                                            
43. See Carlson, supra note 25, at 11 (noting that the Committee is not a court, but it 
does have interpretative authority grounded in a legally binding treaty obligation); Civil and 
Political Rights: The Human Rights Committee Fact Sheet No. 15 (Rev. 1), http://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet15rev.1en.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2014), 
[hereinafter HRC Fact Sheet 15] (describing that if the HRC finds a violation in a case, the 
State party is requested to remedy that violation pursuant to the obligation in Article 2, 
Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR). 
44. See Carlson, supra note 25, at 11 (discussing the effects of HRC decisions); 
Individual Communications, supra note 42 (discussing the follow-up procedures after a 
violation has been found). 
45. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 19. 
46. Id. 
47. Molly Land, Toward an International Law of the Internet, 54 HARV. INT'L L.J. 393, 
396 (2013) (explaining how recent human rights reports have neglected to address the 
Internet). See generally Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., Vol. 1, 97th-99th Sess., Oct. 12-
Oct. 30, 2009, Mar. 8-Mar. 26, 2010, July 12-July 30, 2010, U.N. Doc. A/65/40; GAOR, 65th 
Sess., Supp. No. 40, (2010) [hereinafter HRC 2009-2010 Report] (failing to address any issues 
regarding the Internet).  
48. See HRC 2009-2010 Report, supra note 47; Land, supra note 47, at 397 (discussing 
the absence of issues relating to the Internet in the 2009-2010 Human Rights Report). 
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ICCPR provides no explicit protection for Internet access, a concept 
that did not exist during the drafting process.49 Nonetheless, scholars 
argue that the ICCPR explicitly protects expression in the “media,” 
and that the drafters intended to include later-developed technologies, 
such as the Internet, under Article 19.50 Scholars have looked to 
recent HRC reports and publications that recognize the importance of 
the Internet with respect to the right to freedom of expression.51 For 
instance, in his May 2011 report, the Special Rapporteur for Freedom 
of Expression, Frank La Rue, observed that Article 19 of the UDHR, 
the precursor to the ICCPR, was drafted with the foresight to include 
and accommodate future technological developments.52 Special 
Rapporteur Frank La Rue wrote that, in light of the importance of the 
Internet to human rights, “facilitating access to the Internet for all 
individuals, with as little restrictions to online content as possible, 
                                                            
49. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 19. The Internet was in its infancy in the late 1960s, 
and it was used primarily for military purposes. Commercial use of the Internet was not 
widespread until the late 1980s. See generally Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET 
SOCIETY, http://www.Internetsociety.org/Internet/what-Internet/history-Internet/brief-history-
Internet (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (providing the history of Internet development). 
50. See Human Rights Comm., Gen. Comment No. 34, Art. 19: Freedoms of Opinion 
and Expression, 102nd Sess., July 11-July 29, 2011, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sep. 12, 
2011) (establishing that Article 19(2) protects all means of expression, including web-based 
modes of expression) [hereinafter UN General Comment 34]; Land, supra note 47, at 394 
(arguing that although Article 19 does not guarantee a right to the Internet, it explicitly protects 
the media of expression and information)..  
51. See Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, U.N. Doc. A/66/290 (Aug. 10, 2011) (by Frank La Rue) (declaring that access to 
the Internet is essential to enjoy the rights enumerated in the ICCPR) [hereinafter August 2011 
La Rue Report]; Land, supra note 47, at 398-402 (noting the recent scholarly attention 
regarding the Internet and human rights); . 
52.  Special Rapporteur on The Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, Rep. on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, 7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27, (May 16, 2011) [hereinafter May 2011 
La Rue Report] (explaining that as a result of the UDHR drafters’ foresight, “the framework of 
international human rights law remains relevant today and equally applicable to new 
communication technologies such as the Internet”); cf. Land, supra note 47, at 402 (utilizing a 
textual approach, Professor Land interprets the term “media” to include both the form and the 
channel of expression). A Special Rapporteur is an expert appointed by the HRC to examine 
and report on a country’s situation on a specific area of human rights. Special Rapporteur La 
Rue was the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression from August 2008 to July 2014. See Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, UNITED 
NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ISSUES/FREEDOMOPINION/Pages/
OpinionIndex.aspx (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (describing the role of the Special Rapporteur).  
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should be a priority for all states.”53 In addition, his reports 
condemned certain practices that “cut off access to the Internet 
entirely” as “disproportionate,” thus violating Article 19 of the 
ICCPR.54  
Scholars argue that although a “freedom to connect” is not 
specifically articulated in Article 19(2), the freedom is supported by 
Article 19’s explicit protection of the rights to seek, receive, and 
impart information.55 The text of Article 19(2) suggests that every 
type of expression communicable is protected, subject to the 
limitations in Paragraph 3 permitting censorship of speech where 
necessary.56  
Article 19(3) establishes that limitations on the rights 
enumerated in Article 19 shall only be provided by law and must be 
necessary for the respect of the rights or reputations of others, the 
protection of national security, public order, public health, or 
morals.57 Interpreting this provision, Special Rapporteur Frank La 
Rue articulated the following test: 
Any restriction on expression must be provided by law, 
which must be formulated with sufficient precision to 
enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct 
accordingly and must be made accessible to the public 
(principles of predictability and transparency);  
                                                            
53. See May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 52, at 4 (recognizing the importance of the 
Internet in building democratic societies). 
54. Special Rapporteur La Rue was referring to several incidents, including Egypt’s 
2011 Internet blackout, the “three strikes-law” in France, and the 2010 Digital Economy Act. 
See May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 53, at 10-14. 
55. See Land, supra note 48, at 410. Professor Land also noted that an international 
“freedom to connect” is also supported by Former Secretary of State of the United States 
Hillary Clinton’s January 2010 Speech. Secretary Clinton articulated that there were additional 
freedoms that were inherent in the freedoms identified by former United States President 
Franklin Roosevelt in his 1941 Four Freedoms speech. This “freedom to connect,” is 
predicated on the idea that governments should not limit people from connecting to the 
Internet or to each other. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks on Internet 
Freedom, (Jan. 21, 2010), (transcript available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/
20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/135519.htm) (noting that the freedom to connect is analogous to 
a freedom of assembly in cyber space). 
56. See Human Rights Comm., Views on Commc’ns Nos. 359/1989 and 385/1989, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/47359/1989 and 385/1989/Rev.1 (1993) (May 5, 1993) (finding that Article 19 
protects any form of subjective idea or opinion capable of transmission); Carlson, supra note 
25, at 121 (describing that while Article 19(2) mentions several types of media, it protects 
expression in any other media). 
57. See ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 19(3).  
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The restriction must pursue one of the purposes set out in 
Article 19(3) of the ICCPR, namely (1) to protect the rights 
and reputations of others, or (2) to protect national security 
or of public order, or of public health or morals (principle 
of legitimacy); and  
The restriction must be proven necessary and the least 
restrictive means required to achieve the purported aim 
(principles of necessity and proportionality).58  
International courts have used variations of the three-part test to 
examine limitations on freedom of expression.59 
2. Internet Censorship 
Internet censorship schemes are commonly divided into two 
groups: hard censorship and soft censorship.60 Hard censorship 
involves a government exercising control over Internet infrastructure 
or compelling intermediaries to do so through the force of law.61 Soft 
censorship, on the other hand, involves employing laws as a pretext to 
block material, paying for filtered access, or persuading 
intermediaries to restrict content.62 Acts of soft censorship, such as 
withholding state assistance, may be less legitimate because they are 
not as visible as attempts at hard censorship, such as firewalls and 
                                                            
58. May 2010 La Rue Report, supra note 52, at 6-7 (explaining the three-part cumulative 
test); see August 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 51, at 8 (requiring limitations on freedom of 
expression to meet the three-part test). 
59. See, e.g., Lingens v. Austria, App. No. 9815/82, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 407, ¶¶ 39-40 
(1986) (Eur. Ct. H.R.) (espousing a standard similar to the three-part test); see also Agnes 
Callamard, Expert Meeting on the Links Between Article 19 and 20 of the ICCPR: Freedom of 
Expression and Advocacy of Religious Hatred that Constitutes Incitement to Discrimination, 
Hostility or Violence, ARTICLE 19 (Oct. 2-3, 2008), http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/
conferences/iccpr-links-between-articles-19-and-20.pdf (discussing the use of the three-part 
test in international courts). 
60. See Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 867 (describing the types of 
censorship); Soft Censorship, Hard Impact: A Global Review, WORLD ASS’N OF NEWSPAPERS 
AND NEWS PUBLISHERS, at 4-5 (providing an overview of soft censorship). 
61. Hard censorship schemes are often blocked by architectural or constitutional 
constraints. See Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 867. 
62. In Orwell’s Armchair, Professor Bambauer argues that soft censorship is less 
legitimate than hard censorship because soft censorship models are not transparent, open, or 
narrowly applied as hard censorship models. See Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, 
at 867. See also Don Podesta, Op-Ed., The Rise of Soft Censorship, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 
2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/01/
AR2009020101671.html (discussing an Illinois politician’s threat of withholding state 
assistance from a newspaper’s parent company if the company did not fire specific members of 
the editorial board who were critical of him). 
2015] BRINGING IN A NEW SCALE 837 
explicit censorship laws.63 For instance, after Hong Kong newspaper 
publisher Next Media printed several articles opposing a proposed 
security law in China, the company lost considerable advertising 
revenue when the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) pressured 
companies not to do business with the company.64 
Filtering utilizes technological systems to prevent end-users 
from receiving specific content.65 While the act of filtering is a form 
of hard censorship, it can also be the result of attempts at soft 
censorship.66 Internet filters have been implemented at various levels, 
from the physical network infrastructure, forming the backbone of the 
Internet-to-Internet service providers (“ISPs”), private networks, and 
individual computers.67 During the early 1990s, there were commonly 
two types of Internet filters: the inclusion filter and the exclusion 
filter.68 Inclusion filters typically use “white lists” to include websites 
that are permitted for browsing, whereas an exclusion filter employs a 
                                                            
63. See Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 868 (discussing why soft 
censorship is often less legitimate than hard censorship); Podesta Op-Ed, supra note 62 
(discussing various forms of indirect censorship). 
64. Don Podesta, Soft Censorship: How the Government Around the Globe Use Money 
to Manipulate the Media, CENTER FOR INT’L MEDIA ASSISTANCE (Jan. 9, 2009), 
http://www.academia.edu/3651678/Soft_Censorship_How_Governments_Around_the_Globe_
Use_Money_to_Manipulate_the_Media (reporting the PRC’s use of indirect economic 
pressures to chill speech); Podesta Op-Ed, supra note 62 (reporting on the PRC’s indirect 
censorship). 
65. An end-user is the person that uses the finished product, and is differentiated from 
other types of users, such as developers, installers, and servicers. See Definition: End User,  
WHATIS, (Apr. 2005), http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/end-user; What are Internet 
Filters?, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/en-GB/security/resources/internetfilters-
whatis.aspx (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (explaining the role and properties of Internet filters).  
66. See Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 889-91 (discussing United 
States Congress’ use of subsidies to implement filters in US public schools and libraries); also 
Internet Filtering as a Form of Soft Censorship, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 19, 2010), http://
www.computerworld.com/article/2468012/endpoint-security/internet-filtering-as-a-form-of-
soft-censorship.html (discussing the effects of the Children’s Internet Protection Act). 
67. See Marc D. Nawyn, Code Red: Responding to the Moral Hazards Facing U.S. 
Information Technology Companies in China, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 505, 511 
(describing the implementation of Internet filtering in a variety of access points); About 
Filtering, OPENNET INITIATIVE, https://opennet.net/about-filtering (last visited Apr. 5, 2015) 
(overview of Internet filtering). 
68. See Nawyn, supra note 67, at 510 (describing inclusion and exclusion filters); see 
also Marjorie Heins & Christina Cho, Internet Filters: A Public Policy Report, Free 
Expression Policy Project, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST CENSORSHIP (2001), available at 
http://ncac.org/wp-content/uploads/import/Internet%20Filter.pdf (describing early Internet 
Filters). 
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“blacklist” which specifies websites that users are prohibited from 
visiting.69  
Currently, Internet filtering technology has progressed towards 
using “content analysis” in place of whitelists and blacklists.70 Filters 
utilizing content analysis prevents users from accessing any site 
containing specified keywords, phrases, or even images.71 This 
provides two key advantages to censors over the traditional exclusion 
and inclusion filters.72 First, unlike traditional filters, content analysis 
filters do not need to be regularly updated with URL lists.73 Secondly, 
content analysis filters maintain greater accuracy than filters that 
block sites at the IP address level.74 As a result of its targeted 
blocking, content analysis filters allow users to receive data from sites 
that would otherwise be blocked altogether by traditional filters.75 
Content analysis filters have been compared to “censoring out 
individual sentences within books, as opposed to censoring entire 
books themselves.”76  
B. Internet Censorship: The United States 
1. The Onset of Internet Censorship in the United States 
Over the course of US history, the First Amendment of the US 
Constitution has developed into a bulwark against government 
                                                            
69. See Ronald J. Deibert & Nart Villeneuve, Firewalls and Power: An Overview of 
Global State Censorship of the Internet, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 112, 112 
(Andrew Murray & Mathias Klang eds., 2004) (describing exclusion and inclusion filters); 
Nawyn, supra note 67, at 511-12 (explaining the difference between white and black lists). 
70. See Nawyn, supra note 67, at 511 (discussing the trend towards content analysis 
filters); see also Jyh-An Lee & Ching-Yi Liu, Forbidden City Enclosed by the Great Firewall: 
The Law and Power of the Internet Filtering in China, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI & TECH. 125, 131 
(2012) (describing China’s adoption of content-analysis filters).  
71. See Nawyn, supra note 67, at 511 (explaining how content analysis filters operate); 
Deibert, supra note 70, at 112 (describing the capabilities of content analysis filters). 
72. See, e.g., Nawyn, supra note 67, at 511 (explaining the advantages of content 
analysis filters over exclusion and inclusion filters); Real-time Content Analysis, BLOXX, http:/
/www.bloxx.com/product-technical-info/1/real_time-content-analysis (last visited Apr. 5, 
2015) (comparing the key differences of their content analysis filters and traditional exclusion 
filters). 
73. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (comparing the differences between 
content analysis filters and traditional filters). 
74. See, e.g., Deibert, supra note 69, at 113 (discussing the advantages of content 
analysis filters); Nawyn, supra note 68, at 511-13 (describing the benefits of content analysis 
filtering). 
75. See Deibert, supra note 70 at 113; Nawyn, supra note 67, at 511-13.  
76. See Deibert, supra note 70 at 113; Nawyn, supra note 67, at 511-13. 
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attempts at censorship.77 Despite the First Amendment and the 
decentralized nature of the Internet, in 1996, the US Congress made 
its first attempt to regulate Internet content with the Communications 
Decency Act (“CDA”).78 Section 223(d) (1) criminalized the use 
interactive computer services to knowingly transmit “patently 
offensive” communications to children under the age of eighteen.79 In 
American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, the American Civil Liberties 
Union (“ACLU”) sought a preliminary injunction against the 
enforcement of the CDA in the District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, arguing, inter alia, that the CDA was 
unconstitutionally vague and failed to define “indecent” and “patently 
offensive.”80 The District Court ultimately found that the CDA’s 
effect on the protected speech of adults was “too intrusive to be 
outweighed by the government's asserted interest . . . in protecting 
minors from access to indecent material.”81 Consequently, the District 
Court held that the CDA was facially unconstitutional.82  
Agreeing with the District Court’s findings, the Supreme Court 
struck down § 223 of the CDA.83 Justice Stevens, writing for the 
majority, explained that the Act was unconstitutionally vague, and 
that the ambiguous language rendered the CDA inconsistent with the 
purposes of the First Amendment.84 Justice Stevens further noted that 
the lack of definitions for both “patently offensive” and “indecent” 
creates ambiguity about the relationship between the two standards.85 
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Reno, Congress 
passed the Child Online Protection Act (“COPA”) in 1998.86 COPA 
                                                            
77. Modern First Amendment jurisprudence has greatly expanded what was traditionally 
regarded as “speech.” See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002). Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the majority, regarded the First Amendment as a “vast and privileged 
sphere.” Id.; see also Blake Covington Norvell, The Modern First Amendment and Copyright 
Law, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 547, 549-52 (2009) (arguing that the modern First 
Amendment doctrine is more than a doctrine against prior restraints) 
78. Communication Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1996), invalidated by Reno 
v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) [hereinafter CDA]. 
79. CDA § 223(d)(1)(A). See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 829 (E.D. Pa. 1996) 
(providing an overview of the statutory provisions at issue) aff'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  
80. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 826-28. 
81. Id. at 855. 
82. Id. at 883. 
83. Reno, 521 U.S. at 875.  
84. Id. at 870. 
85. Id. at 871.  
86. Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 231 (1998), invalidated by Am. Civil 
Liberties Union v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2008) [hereinafter COPA]. 
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revised the CDA’s prior proscription of transmitting indecent 
communciations to individuals under the age of eighteen to 
prohibiting such communications toindividuals under the age of 
seventeen.87 The scope of COPA was narrowed in its application to 
the “World Wide Web” and commercial sites.88 Furthermore, the 
revised statute prohibits material that is “harmful to minors” rather 
than “indecent material.”89 Both the CDA and COPA provided an 
affirmative defense to Internet publishers that implemented access 
restrictions through age verification and credit card requirements.90  
Presently, COPA has been effectively disabled after a rally of 
legal battles.91 In 1998, similar to the CDA, the ACLU challenged 
COPA the day President Clinton signed it into law.92 The Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania subsequently granted an initial preliminary 
                                                            
87. Compare COPA § 231(e)(7) (defining “minor” as any person under 17 years of age), 
with CDA § 223 (prohibiting transmissions of indcent communcaitions to individuals under 18 
years of age). 
88. Compare COPA § 231 (a)(1) (“[B]y means of the World Wide Web”), with CDA 
§ 223(h)(1)(C) (“[T]ransmitted, in whole or in part, by the Internet”). The World Wide Web 
should not be conflated with the Internet. The World Wide Web is a separate platform that 
utilizes the Internet to transmit data. See Keith Wagstaff, The Internet and the World Wide 
Web Are Not the Same Thing, NBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/
Internet/Internet-world-wide-web-are-not-same-thing-n51011 (describing the difference 
between the World Wide Web and the Internet). 
Compare COPA § 231(e)(2)(A)-(B) (limiting the scope to commercial websites), with 
CDA § 223 (prohibiting all transfer of the obscene and offensive content to minors). 
89. CDA § 223 encountered fatal scrutiny in Reno because, among other things, 
“indecent” was not defined. Reno, 521 U.S. at 871. COPA, on the other hand, utilizes the 
Miller test to determine whether the content is obscene. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 570 
(2002). The expression is obscene if: 
(1) . . . the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would 
find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, that the material is 
designed to appeal to the prurient interests; (2) it depicts, describes or represents, in 
a manner patently offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act 
or sexual contact, an actual or simulated or perverted sexual act, or a lewd 
exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breasts; and (3) taken as a whole 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value for minors. 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (establishing the Miller or “Three-Prong Obscenity” 
Test). 
90. CDA. § 223(e); COPA U.S.C. § 231(c)-(d). 
91. See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (discussing the procedural history of 
the “COPA cases”). 
92. See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999) aff'd, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 
2000), vacated sub nom., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (enjoining the enforcement 
of COPA after President Clinton signed it into law on Oct. 21, 1998); The Legal Challenge to 
the Child Online Protection Act, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CENTER, http://epic.org/
free_speech/copa/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (describing the procedural history of ACLU v. 
Reno). 
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injunction against government enforcement of COPA.93 After several 
appeals and a remand, in 2009 the Supreme Court of the United States 
finally refused to grant the government’s petition for writ of 
certiorari, which conclusively disabled COPA.94  
In another attempt to protect children from inappropriate content 
on the Internet, the US Congress passed the Children’s Internet 
Protection Act (“CIPA”) in 2000.95 Departing from CDA and 
COPA’s punitive approach, CIPA conditioned a school or library’s 
receipt of certain federal funding on the implementation of protective 
measures, namely Internet filters.96 The protective measures were 
required to restrict access to material containing visual depictions of 
child pornography or material that is obscene or harmful to minors.97 
CIPA also allows authorized library personnel to disable the filtering 
software for “bona fide research or other lawful purposes.”98 In 2003, 
the Supreme Court held that CIPA, at least facially, did not violate the 
First Amendment.99 Justice Kennedy reasoned that the filtering policy 
did not burden constitutionally protected speech if an adult could 
simply ask a librarian to disable the filter without delay.100  
                                                            
93. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 499. 
94. See Mukasey v. ACLU, 129 S. Ct. 1032 (2009) (mem.); Scott Nicholas, COPA 
Child-Porn Law Killed, PCWORLD (Jan. 22, 2009, 8:00 AM) http://www.pcworld.com/
article/158131/copa_killed.html (reporting the end of COPA). 
95. The CIPA affects two federal grant statutes. Children's Internet Protection Act of 
2001, (CIPA) Pub. L. No. 106-554, §§ 1701-1741, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (codified at 20 
U.S.C.A. § 9134 (2010) and 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(h) (2008)). The Library Services and 
Technology Act (“LSTA”) authorizes grants to state library administrative agencies to, inter 
alia, assist libraries in accessing information through the Internet and to pay costs for libraries 
to acquire and share computer systems and telecommunication technology. See Omnibus 
Consolidated Appropriation Act of 1997. Pub. L. No. 104–208 Title II, § 212, 110 Stat. 3009-
295 (1996)_(codified at 20 U.S.C.A. § 9121 (2010)) 
The E-Rate program established by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides 
qualifying libraries a discount to Internet access. See Telecommunications Act of 1996. Pub. 
L. No. 104-104, § 254, 110 Stat. 71 (1996) (codified in  47 U.S.C.A § 254(h)(1)(b) (2008)); 
Amitai Etzioni, On Protecting Children from Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 15 (2004) 
(providing an overview of CIPA). 
96. 20 U.S.C.A § 9134(f)(A) (2010); 47 U.S.C.A § 254(h)(6)(B)(i) (2008). Congress 
became concerned that federal funds were being used to facilitate access to pornography. See 
S. REP. NO. 106–41, at 2 (1998) (“[Pornography] may be accessed directly and intentionally, 
or may turn up as the unintended product of a general Internet search.”). 
97. 20 U.S.C.A. § 9134(f)(1)(A) (2010); 47 U.S.C.A § 254(h)(6)(B)(i) (2008) 
98. 20 U.S.C.A § 9134(f)(3) (2010); 47 U.S.C.A § 254(h)(6)(D) (2008) 
99. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
100. See id. at 214. 
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In the United States, telecommunication companies own and 
operate a significant majority of the Internet’s infrastructure.101 
Nonetheless, various US agencies regulate the Internet in some 
capacity. For instance, the Department of Homeland Security protects 
the integrity of the infrastructure from natural disasters and cyber-
attacks.102 The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) monitors online 
advertising and tracking.103 In 2010, the Federal Communication 
Commission (“FCC”) released an “Open Internet” Order mandating 
that ISPs not block lawful content and services, subject to reasonable 
network management, and requiring ISPs to not unreasonably 
discriminate against transmission of lawful traffic.104 However, on 
January 14, 2014, the US Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia struck down the core non-discriminatory provision of the 
2010 Order.105  
2. US Copyright Laws and Their Chilling Effects 
Scholars have argued that copyright laws inherently affect 
freedom of speech.106 However, copyright laws are permitted even in 
                                                            
101. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTERNET INFRASTRUCTURE: 
CHALLENGES IN DEVELOPING A PUBLIC/PRIVATE RECOVERY (October 23, 2007), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/118189.pdf (discussing that vast majority of its infrastructure is 
currently owned and operated by the private sector).  
102. See id. (reporting DHS’ plans in coordinating with private industry infrastructure 
stakeholders to produce various Internet recovery-related plans). See generally Court Rules 
Dept. of Homeland Security Must Reveal ‘Internet Kill Switch’ Protocol, RT, (Nov. 17, 2013, 
2:19 AM) http://rt.com/usa/homeland-security-Internet-kill-switch-742/ (reporting the District 
Court’s decision to require DHS to reveal its rumored capabilities to shut down the Internet 
during national crises). 
103. See Press Release, FTC, FTC Staff Revises Online Behavioral Advertising 
Principles, (Feb. 12, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2009/
02/ftc-staff-revises-online-behavioral-advertising-principles (reporting the FTC’s recent 
revision to balance the potential benefits of behavioral advertising against the privacy 
concerns).  
104. Many dubbed the FCC Order as the net-neutrality order because it prevented 
discrimination based on content. See Open Internet, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/openInternet 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (discussing the principle of net-neutrality).  
105. While the Court of Appeals upheld the transparency requirement of the FCC order, 
the court struck down the anti-blocking and nondiscrimination provisions to broadband 
providers. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
106. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech: 
Why the Copyright Extension Act Is Unconstitutional, 36 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 83 (2002) 
(providing a general overview of the copyright law vis-à-vis the First Amendment); David S. 
Olson, First Amendment Interests and Copyright Accommodations, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1393, 
1395 (2009) (discussing the inherent tension between the First Amendment's community right 
to hear and copyright law). 
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societies that value the free exchange of expression because copyright 
laws are seen overall as enhancing expression by incentivizing new 
creations and publications.107 On March 1, 1989, the United States 
became a party to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works (the “Berne Convention”), an international 
agreement governing copyrights.108 In efforts to expand the scope of 
the Berne Convention, a 100-year-old copyright agreement, to the 
digital era, members of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(“WIPO”) adopted the World Intellectual Property Organization 
Copyright Treaty (“WIPO Treaty”) in 1996.109 The WIPO Treaty 
requires members to, among other things, establish adequate legal 
protection against the circumvention of technological protections used 
by authors in protecting their works.110 However, US implementation 
of the WIPO Treaty resulted in unforeseen chilling effects on Internet 
speech.111 
In 1998, the US Congress enacted the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (“DMCA”) in accordance with the WIPO treaty.112 
Specifically, the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation 
                                                            
107. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (recognizing that copyright laws 
spur the creation and publication of new expressions); Chemerinsky, supra note 108, at 83 
(discussing how copyright law may be consistent with the First Amendment when it exists to 
encourage the creation and distribution of more speech). 
108. The United States became a party to the Berne Convention through the adoption of 
The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The Berne 
Convention was first accepted in Berne, Switzerland, in 1886. See Binyomin Kaplan, 
Determining Ownership of Foreign Copyright: A Three-Tier Proposal, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2045, 2050 n.20 (2000) (noting that Berne Convention was originally signed by ten nations in 
1886). 
109. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996, 
S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO Treaty]; see WIPO 
Treaties - General Information, WORLD INTELL. PROPERTY ORG., http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/en/general/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (providing the history of the WIPO). 
110. See WIPO Treaty, supra note 109, at art. 11 (requiring members to provide legal 
protections and remedies against the circumvention of technological measures); Universal City 
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 440 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing that the DMCA was 
enacted in compliance with the WIPO treaty).  
111. See Unintended Consequences: Fifteen Years under the DMCA, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (March 2013), https://www.eff.org/pages/unintended-consequences-fifteen-
years-under-dmca (discussing the DMCA’s effect on Internet speech); infra notes 275-92 
(describing the DMCA’s chilling effect). 
112. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, at 1 (1998) (discussing the implementation of the 
WIPO treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty); David L. Hitchcock & Kathy E. 
Needleman, Current Status of Copyright Protection in the Digital Age and Related Topics, 8 
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 539, 550-54 (2002) (providing a brief overview of the DMCA). 
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Act (“OCILLA”) codified Title II of the DMCA.113 Title II, 
commonly referred to as “§ 512,” protects service providers by 
establishing a “safe harbor,” which limits the service’s intermediary 
liability for the copyright infringement of its users provided that the 
service provider implements copyright policies and a notice-and-
takedown system.114 Upon receiving notice, a service provider must 
promptly remove or block access to the material in order to qualify 
for the § 512 safe harbor.115  
Generally, the DMCA’s system of counter-notification forces the 
online poster to reassert the lawfulness of his speech.116 For example, 
if a subscriber provides a proper “counter-notice” claiming that the 
material does not infringe a copyright, the service provider must then 
promptly notify the claiming party of the individual's objection.117 By 
providing a “counter-notice,” however, the counter-notifier must 
submit, among other things, her name and address to the service 
provider.118 This presents a problem for Internet users who want to 
remain anonymous. For instance, suspected terrorist organizations 
have used DMCA takedowns of YouTube videos critical of Islam in 
efforts to obtain the uploader’s address and name.119 
                                                            
113. See 17 U.S.C.A, § 512 (2010); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 
26-28 (2012) (providing factual background of the DMCA Safe Harbor); see also S. Rep. No. 
105-190, at 2 (1998) (addressing the need of a safe harbor provision). 
114. See ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET 
FILTERING 231 (Jonathan Zittrain et al. eds., 2008) (discussing the nature of § 512 safe harbor 
provision). § 512 was intended to balance the need for swift, methodic response to potential 
infringement with the rights of the content-poster. See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 18 (1998) 
(discussing concerns regarding the application of § 512). 
115. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1) (2010); Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient 
Process or "Chilling Effects"? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 625-26 (2006) 
(describing the 512 takedown mechanism). 
116. See Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright's Safe Harbor: Chilling 
Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171, 177 (2010) 
(explaining that the added cost operates as censorship). But see Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra 
note 21, at 401 (recognizing that there is value in the DMCA’s citizen-participatory process). 
117. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(g)(2)(B)-(C) (2010); see Question: What are the Counter-Notice 
and Put-Back Procedures?, CHILLING EFFECTS, http://www.chillingeffects.org/question.cgi? 
QuestionID=132 (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (describing § 512 counter-notice and put-back 
procedures). 
118. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(g)(3)(D) (2010). 
119. See Stephen Doble, Youtubers Targeted by Terrorists After Copyright Claim, 
VIDEOTER (Nov. 6, 2014), http://videoter.com/youtubers-targeted-by-terrorists-after-dmca-
claim/ (reporting the suspected use of DMCA takedowns by terrorist organizations); Paul 
Tamburro, Terrorists Hunt Down Youtuber Using Information From Fake DMCA Claim, 
CRAVEONLINE (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.craveonline.com/lifestyle/tech-and-gadgets-news/
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3. SOPA and PIPA: The Menacing Twins 
Recently, Congress encountered the ire of Internet users, tech 
companies, and scholars with the proposal of the Stop Online Privacy 
Act (“SOPA”) and its Senate counterpart, Protect Internet Property 
Act (“PIPA”).120 SOPA was directed towards websites that are 
“dedicated to the theft of US property.”121 Under section 102(a), a 
foreign website is deemed to be a “foreign infringing site” if:  
(1) the Internet site or portion thereof is a U.S.-directed site 
and is used by users in the United States;  
(2) the owner or operator of such Internet site is committing 
or facilitating the commission of criminal violations 
punishable under . . . Title 18, United States Code; and  
(3) the Internet site would, by reason of acts described in 
paragraph (1), be subject to seizure in the United States in 
an action brought by the Attorney General if such site were 
a domestic Internet site.122  
In practice, a foreign website hosting user-generated content 
may be deemed an “infringing site” under § 102 simply because of 
the allegedly infringing acts of a single user.123 
SOPA has the potential to fundamentally change the current 
DMCA notice-and-takedown regime without providing adequate due 
process.124 The language in § 102 and § 103 of the bill grants 
complainants or the Attorney General the ability to stop online 
advertisers and credit card processors from doing business with the 
                                                                                                                                     
785199-terrorists-hunt-youtuber-using-information-fake-dmca-claim (reporting that a 
Youtuber is hiding from suspected terrorists after sharing his information pursuant to the 
DMCA counter-notification procedures). 
120. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. Bill 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); Preventing Real 
Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011, S. Bill 
968, 112th Cong. (2011). 
121. H.R. 3261 § 103; see Jan André BlackBurn-Cabera, Streaming Movies Online: The 
E! True Hollywood Story 5 U. PUERTO RICO BUS. L.J. 59, 86 (2014).  
122. H.R. 3261 § 102(a). 
123. Note H.R. 3261 § 102(a)’s lack of any intent or knowledge requirement. See id. A 
foreign website can be deemed an infringing site without inducement or knowledge of the 
criminal infringement by site’s operator. See id; see also Luke Johnson, What is SOPA? Anti-
Piracy Bill Explained, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 19, 2012), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/19/what-is-sopa_n_1216725.html#s620431title=
Rep_Keith_Ellison (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (reporting the effects of SOPA). 
124. See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text (explaining SOPA’s notice 
procedure). 
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targeted website, by the mere act of filing a unilateral complaint.125 
For example, if PayPal receives notice from a complainant, PayPal 
has five days to disable its financial services with the alleged website 
in order to be protected under the law.126  
A host of critics have argued that SOPA would negatively 
impact US cybersecurity and violate the First Amendment.127 The 
Electronic Freedom Foundation, an international organization that 
deals with legal issues in the digital world, argues that SOPA 
essentially allows the Attorney General to blacklist companies from 
doing business using the web.128 Constitutional scholar Laurence H. 
Tribe argues that the notice-and-termination procedure of § 103(a) is 
inconsistent with “prior restraint” doctrine.129 In US First Amendment 
jurisprudence, prior restraint occurs when restrictions are placed on 
expression before the expression occurs.130 Section 103(a) delegates 
to a private party the power to suppress speech without prior notice 
and a judicial hearing.131   
                                                            
125.  H.R. Bill 3261 §§ 102(c), 103(b); see BlackBurn-Cabera, supra note 122, at 86 
(explaining that SOPA would have allow the removal of copyright infringing content from 
websites without providing adequate procedures for websites to defend themselves). 
126. See H.R. 3261 § 103(b). 
127. See Growing Chorus of Opposition to "Stop Online Piracy Act", CENTER FOR 
DEMOCRACY AND TECH. (Nov. 4, 2011), https://www.cdt.org/report/growing-chorus-
opposition-stop-online-piracy-act (listing concerns and complaints of a growing chorus of 
opposition to SOPA); Tim Hornyak, Blare Your Dissent with Anti-SOPA Ringtones, CNET 
(Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.cnet.com/news/blare-your-dissent-with-anti-sopa-ringtone/ 
(reporting one way to protest against SOPA and PIPA). 
128. Trevor Timm, The Stop Online Piracy Act: A Blacklist by Any Other Name is Still A 
Blacklist, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 7, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2011/11/stop-online-piracy-act-blacklist-any-other-name-still-blacklist (discussing how the bill 
gives the Attorney General the power to essentially blacklist companies from doing business 
on the Internet); see Parker Higgins, What's On the Blacklist? Three Sites That SOPA Could 
Put at Risk, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 15, 2012), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/11/whats-blacklist-three-sites-sopa-could-put-risk 
(discussing three sites that may be negatively affected by SOPA). 
129. Laurence H. Tribe is a Professor of Constitutional Law at Harvard Law School. See 
Lawerence H. Tribe, The “Stop Online Piracy Act” (SOPA) Violates The First Amendment, 
SERENDIPITY (last visited Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.serendipity.li/cda/tribe-legis-memo-on-
SOPA-12-6-11-1.pdf  (arguing that SOPA violates the First Amendment because the language 
of the bill is impermissibly vague and amounts to prior restraint).  
130.  See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (invalidating a 
Rhode Island law that created an extrajudicial committee based on the prior restraint doctrine); 
see Robert Plotkin, Fighting Keywords: Translating the First Amendment to Protect Software 
Speech, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 329, 389 (Fall 2003) (describing the use of prior 
restraint doctrine in respect to circumvention software). 
131. See H.R. 3261 § 102(a); Tribe, supra note 129 (arguing that section 102 amounts to 
a form of extrajudicial prior restraint). 
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Similar to its twin bill in the US House of Representatives, 
SOPA, PIPA authorizes a private right of action for copyright holders 
against alleged infringing websites.132 However, unlike SOPA, PIPA 
limits its target to websites with “no significant use other than 
engaging in, enabling, or facilitating the reproduction, distribution, or 
public performance of copyrighted works . . . .”133  
On November 15, 2011, several tech giants placed a full-page 
advertisement in the New York Times telling members of Congress 
that they do not support the language of the bills.134 On January 18, 
2012, English Wikipedia, Reddit, Google, and others temporarily shut 
down or altered their websites in order to protest SOPA and PIPA.135 
Facing large opposition from the Internet and tech community, US 
House of Representative Lamar Smith stated that “[t]he House 
Judiciary Committee [would] postpone consideration of the 
legislation until there is a wider agreement on a solution.”136 
In sum, the US legislation-based model is largely influenced by 
concerns of protecting property rights and minors from obscenity.137 
                                                            
132. S. Bill 968, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011). 
133. See Mike Masnick, Full Text Of The PROTECT IP Act Released: The Good, The 
Bad And The Horribly Ugly, TECHDIRT (May 11, 2011), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20110511/00115314234/full-text-protect-ipact-released-good-bad-horribly-ugly.shtml 
(discussing pros and cons of PIPA). Compare H.R. 3261 § 102 (broadly defining a foreign 
infringing websites), with S. Bill 968 § 2 (defining “Internet site dedicated to infringing 
activities” as a website with “no significant use other than engaging in, enabling, or facilitating 
the reproduction, distribution, or public performance of copyrighted works . . . .”)., 
134. See Andrew Couts, Internet Titans Fight SOPA With Full-Page NY Times Ad, 
DIGITAL TRENDS (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.digitaltrends.com/web/internet-titans-fight-
sopa-with-full-page-ny-times-ad/; Cory Doctorow, Internet Giants Place Full-Page Anti-
SOPA Ad in NYT, BOINGBOING (Nov. 16, 2011), http://boingboing.net/2011/11/16/Internet-
giants-place-full-pag.html.  
135. See Tom Cheredar, SOPA Blackouts and Protests Go Live (Gallery of Screenshots), 
VENTUREBEAT (Jan. 17, 2012), http://venturebeat.com/2012/01/17/sopa-protests-go-live 
(reporting that Google updated its homepage with a large sideways black box over the 
company’s logo); SOPA Protests Planned by Google, Wikipedia and Others on Jan. 18, 
WASH. POST, (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sopa-
protests-planned-by-google-wikipedia-and-others-on-jan-18/2012/01/17/
gIQALKBL6P_story.html (reporting the companies’ objection to language in the bills that 
grant the United States Government the right to block entire Web sites with copyright-
infringing content). 
136. Johnathan Weisman, After an Online Firestorm, Congress Shelves Antipiracy Bills, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2012, at B6, available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/
technology/senate-postpones-piracy-vote.html?_r=0 (reporting that congressional leaders 
shelved PIPA and SOPA after facing vehement opposition). 
137. See supra notes 78-136 and accompanying text (describing the various legislations 
that regulate Internet content). 
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In addition, compared to other countries, the US model relies on a 
system of removal through private action rather than blacklisting or 
blocking.138 Despite numerous legislative attempts to regulate speech 
on the Internet, the United States still maintains one of the world’s 
most robust protections for freedom of speech.139 The core value of 
freedom of expression is further evident in community protests 
against bills such as SOPA and PIPA.140 Despite the United States’ 
constitutional protections of speech, the chilling effects caused by the 
country’s copyright laws run afoul of the spirit of Article 19.141 
C. United Kingdom: Watchdogs and the End of Cyber-Libertarianism 
Compared to the United States, the United Kingdom has a 
hands-off approach to regulating Internet content.142 The UK model 
of Internet governance involves, among other things, citizen-
participation and cooperation between private and government 
agencies.143 
                                                            
138. See supra notes 106-119 and accompanying text (discussing the DMCA’s notice-
and-takedown procedure); see also Zittrain, supra note 114, at 226 (describing that US content 
restriction relies more on the removal of content rather than blocking). 
139. See, e.g., Jeremy Maltby, Juggling Comity and Self-Government: The Enforcement 
of Foreign Libel Judgments in U.S. Courts, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1978, 1979 (1994) (comparing 
the speech-protective standard employed by the United States to countries such as Britain and 
Canada, which have libel laws that favor plaintiffs' interest in privacy and reputation at the 
expense of freedom of the press); Timothy Zick, Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free 
Speech at-and Beyond-Our Borders, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1585 (2010) (discussing 
that plaintiffs have obtained judgments against US authors under foreign libel laws that are 
less speech protective than US laws). 
140. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (discussing the community protests 
against SOPA and PIPA). 
141. See May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 52, at 11-12 (arguing that the current 
system of notice-and-takedown systems, such as the DMCA, is subject to abuse by State and 
private actors); Internet Intermediaries, supra note 18, at 10 (discussing comments by 
international bodies on intermediary liability regimes). 
142. See Open Net Initiative: United Kingdom, OPEN NET INITIATIVE, 357 (Dec. 18 
2010), available at https://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_UnitedKingdom_2010.pdf 
(noting that the UK’s “no-table libertarian tradition” is manifested by its solid guarantees of 
freedom of expression, freedom of information, and protection of privacy) [hereinafter ONI 
UK Report]. See generally, Keen, supra note 20, at 368 (discussing that the United Kingdom’s 
approach to the regulation of Internet content involves allowing Internet users to regulate their 
own Internet experience by offering tools to assist citizens in controlling the content that they 
want to see). 
143. See Keen, supra note 20, at 368; infra notes 150-160 and accompanying text 
(discussing the UK government’s cooperation with the Internet Watch Foundation). 
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As a member of the European Union, the UK has implemented 
the bloc’s directives into law.144 For instance, the UK incorporated 
provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”) 
into the UK Human Rights Act of 1998.145 Similar to Article 19 of the 
ICCPR, Article 10 of the EHCR contains a right to the freedom of 
expression and allows restrictions that are “in accordance with law” 
and “necessary in a democratic society.”146  
1. The Internet Watch Foundation 
In 1996, the UK Metropolitan Police reported that child 
pornography was surfacing on newsgroups, a type of forum with 
discussion of a particular topic.147 The Department of Trade & 
Industry, led discussions with Internet Service Provider Association 
(“ISPA”), Home Office, Metropolitan Police, and Safety-Net 
Foundation, concerning the proliferation of illegal content on the 
newsgroups.148 The result of the discussions was the creation of the 
R3 Safety Net Agreement, which in turn formed the Internet Watch 
Foundation (“IWF”).149 
The IWF is an independent non-government organization, which 
receives support from the UK government.150 The IWF is tasked with 
                                                            
144. See ONI UK Report, supra note 142, at 357 (noting that EU’s law takes precedence over 
national law); Q&A: How UK Adopts EU Laws, BBC (Jul. 21, 2009),  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/europe/8160808.stm (explaining how the United Kingdom adopts EU legislation). 
145. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42. (U.K.). 
146. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.  
147. See IWF History, INTERNET WATCH FOUND., https://www.iwf.org.uk/about-iwf/
iwf-history (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (discussing the history of IWF) [hereinafter IWF 
History]. 
148. The Department of Trade and Industry, a former UK government agency 
responsible for trade, science, and innovation, has been replaced by agencies, such as the 
Department of Business, Enterprise, and Regulatory Reform. ISPA is a trade organization 
comprised of UK Internet Service Providers. The Home Office is a UK government 
department that oversees immigration, security and drug matters. See Keen supra note 16, at 
366 (explaining the history of the IWF); IWF History, supra note 148 (describing the multi-
stakeholder discussion regarding child pornography on the Internet). 
149. The R3 refers to rating, reporting, and responsibility. See IWF History, supra note 
148 (discussing the eventual formation of the IWF). 
150.  See Memorandum of Understanding Between Crown Prosecution Service (“CPS”) 
and the Association of Chief Police Officers (“ACPO”) Concerning Section 46 Sexual 
Offences Act 2003, CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE (Oct. 6, 2004), https://www.cps.gov.uk/
publications/docs/mousexoffences.pdf [hereinafter CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE] (noting 
the police and CPS’ support and partnership with the Internet Watch Foundation in 
establishing hotlines for individuals to report potentially illegal content); Vision and Mission, 
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combating illegal content on the Internet, specifically child 
pornography and criminally obscene adult content.151 The IWF does 
not initiate its own independent investigations, but rather operates 
hotlines where members of the public can report child pornography 
and other illegal content.152 Once a report is filed, the IWF reviews 
the legality of the material.153 Upon a determination that the content 
violates UK law, the IWF attempts to determine the origin of the 
material and reports the content to the UK police or an appropriate 
overseas law enforcement agency.154 In the United Kingdom, Internet 
content is regulated pursuant to “offline” regulations.155 For instance, 
the IWF reviews reported materials in accordance with laws such as 
the Sexual Offense Act of 2003—which criminalizes sex crimes, such 
as rape—and The Protection of Children Act of 1978—which 
criminalizes the creation and possession child pornography.156  
 With respect to Internet filtering, the IWF’s role is limited to 
compiling a blacklist, labeled the “URL list,” from their reports and 
notifying UK ISPs of illegal content.157 The list of blocked websites is 
not made public, however, the IWF maintains that every URL on its 
                                                                                                                                     
INTERNET WATCH FOUND., https://www.iwf.org.uk/about-iwf/remit-vision-and-mission (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2014) (“Our vision is the elimination of child sexual abuse images online”) 
[hereinafter IWF Mission] . 
151. See IWF Mission, supra note 150 (discussing the organization’s goal and mission to 
fight child pornography on the Internet).  
152. See Keen, supra note 21, at 366 (describing the IWF reporting process); see also 
Report Process, INTERNET WATCH FOUNDATION, https://www.iwf.org.uk/hotline/report-
process (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (explaining the IWF’s reporting process) [hereinafter IWF 
Reporting Process]. 
153. See CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE, supra note 151 at 6 (discussing the IWF’s 
role);IWF Reporting Process, supra note 153 (describing the IWF’s reporting process). 
154. See URL List, INTERNET WATCH FOUND., https://www.iwf.org.uk/members/
member-policies/url-list (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (explaining that the IWF’s also notifies 
their partner organizations in other countries of non-UK sites containing pornography) 
[hereinafter IWF URL List].  
155. See Keen, supra note 21, at 368-69 (noting that offline laws govern what is suitable 
on the Internet); see also Internet Censorship: Law & Policy Around the World, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIERS AUSTRALIA, https://www.efa.org.au/Issues/Censor/cens3.html#uk (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2014) (noting that as of the time the report was written, the United Kingdom has not 
enacted censorship legislation specific to the Internet). 
156. See Sexual Offence Act, 2003, c. 42, sch. 6 (U.K.) The Protection of Children Act, 
1978 c. 37 (U.K.); Keen, supra note 21, at 366 (discussing that IWF reviews material pursuant 
to UK “offline” laws); Laws Relating to the IWF's Remit, INTERNET WATCH FOUND., https://
www.iwf.org.uk/hotline/the-laws (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (listing the pertinent laws that 
IWF uses to assess reported material). 
157. See IWF URL List, supra note 154 (discussing the URL list); Keen, supra note 78, 
at 367 (explaining the IWF’s blacklist); Open Net Initiate, supra note 144, at 360 (discussing 
the IWF’s role of compiling a blacklist of websites). 
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list depicts indecent images of children or advertisements to illegal 
content.158 Aside from informal pressures, currently there is no EU or 
UK law that requires ISPs to utilize filters.159 The actual act of 
blocking results from an ISP’s decision to utilize the URL list.160  
In 2003, The British Telecom (“BT”), one of the largest UK 
ISPs, designed a new Internet filtering system, dubbed 
“CleanFeed.”161 CleanFeed is designed to prevent their customers 
from accessing any illegal content listed on the URL list.162 While the 
exact design of BT’s CleanFeed has not been published, research has 
extrapolated the suspected design based.163 CleanFeed purportedly 
utilizes a two-tiered hybrid design of traffic redirection and web 
proxies intended to be extremely precise while maintaining low 
operation costs and management.164  
2. Prime Minister’s Proposal: Default Filtering for Everyone 
In July 2013, UK Prime Minister David Cameron began 
advocating for the default filtering of pornography, prefacing that 
                                                            
158. See IWF URL List Recipients, INTERNET WATCH FOUND., https://www.iwf.org.uk/
members/member-policies/url-list/iwf-list-recipients (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (noting to 
whom the organization gives their URL list); see also Lillian Edwards, ‘From Child Porn to 
China, in One CleanFeed,’ 3(3) SCRIPT-ED, 174 (2006), available at http://
www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol3-3/editorial.pdf (noting that the IWF does not release its 
URL list). 
159. See ONI UK Report, supra note 142, at 359 (“This is consistent with broader EU 
law which states that ISPs acting as ‘mere conduits’ of information are not liable for any 
illegal information transmitted.”); Keen, supra note 21, at 367 (noting that aside from informal 
pressures, ISPs are not required to utilize the URL list). 
160. See IWF URL List, supra note 154 (noting that since 2004 many ISPs have chosen 
to utilize the URL list); see also Keen, supra note 21, at 367 (“[T]the blocking solution is 
entirely a matter for the company deploying the list.”).  
161. See Open Net Initiative: United Kingdom, supra note 144, at 360 (discussing the 
filtering system, CleanFeed). See generally Richard Clayton, Failures in a Hybrid Content 
Blocking System, https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/cleanfeed.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) 
(discussing the flaws of the CleanFeed system).  
162. See Clayton, supra note 161, at 1-2 (explaining the system’s design); see also Open 
Net Initiative: United Kingdom, supra note 144, at 283 (explaining that BT blocks Web sites 
that are flagged by IWF).  
163. See Clayton, supra note 162, at 4 (prefacing his report that BT has not disclosed the 
design of CleanFeed).  
164. See Clayton, supra note 162, at 4 (describing CleanFeed’s two-tier design); Richard 
Clayton, Anonymity and Traceability in Cyberspace, CAMBRIDGE UNIV. COMPUTER 
LABORATORY, TECH. REP. NO. 653, 120-22 (November 2005), available at http://
www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-653.pdf (describing that system’s advantages). 
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online pornography is “corroding childhood.”165 The proposed 
measure will involve preliminary contact from the ISP, asking 
whether the family would like to activate “family friendly filters” to 
restrict adult material.166 Customers who do not select an option will 
have the filters activated by default.167 The proposed measures will 
also affect the UK’s Internet access at the infrastructure level.168 UK 
ISPs have rewired their infrastructure, affecting all devices connected 
to a subscriber’s home Internet account.169 The Open Rights Group, 
an organization defending Internet freedom, spoke with several UK 
ISPs and discovered that users will also be required to opt-in for any 
content tagged as violent, extremist, terrorist, anorexia and eating 
disorders, suicide, alcohol, smoking, Web forums, esoteric material, 
and Web-blocking circumvention tools.170 
                                                            
165. Oliver Wright, David Cameron Cracks Down on Online Pornography With 'Porn 
Block' Option, THE INDEP. (July 22, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/
david-cameron-cracks-down-on-online-pornography-with-porn-block-option-8725803.html 
(reporting that every UK home will have pornography blocked by their Internet provider 
unless the householder choose to receive it); see Ryan Neal, War On Porn In The UK: Does 
David Cameron's Plan To Battle Child Pornography Go Too Far?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 
22, 2013), http://www.ibtimes.com/war-porn-uk-does-david-camerons-plan-battle-child-
pornography-go-too-far-video-1355279 (“By the end of the year, anyone in the UK creating a 
new broadband account or switching ISPs will have to actively disable filters to access porn.”). 
166. See David Cameron, The Internet and Pornography: Prime Minister Calls for 
Action, (July 22, 2013), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-Internet-
and-pornography-prime-minister-calls-for-action (describing the onset of the proposed 
measure); see also supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing the UK Prime Minister’s 
plan). 
167. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text (describing the process of 
implementing the new filters).  
168.  See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text (describing the effect of the new 
filters). 
169. See Cameron, supra note 166 (discussing that the ISPs have rewired their 
technology so that once filters are installed they will cover any device connected to home 
Internet account); Josh Taylor, UK to Automatically filter ‘Adult’ Internet Content, ZDNET 
(Jul. 23, 2013), http://www.zdnet.com/article/uk-to-automatically-filter-adult-internet-content/ 
(reporting that the filters can only be deactivated by an account holder, who must be an adult). 
170. See Ryan Neal, UK Porn Filter: Censorship Extends Beyond Pornography, But One 
ISP Is Fighting Back, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jul. 26, 2013, 2:59 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/uk-
porn-filter-censorship-extends-beyond-pornography-one-isp-fighting-back-1361379 (reporting 
leaks that linked the filters to controversial Chinese company, Huawei); see also Jim Killock, 
Sleepwalking Into Censorship, OPEN RIGHTS GROUP (Jul. 25, 2013), https://
www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2013/sleepwalking-into-censorship (recommending an 
alternative to default filtering). 
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To summarize, the United Kingdom has traditionally operated a 
libertarian model of Internet governance.171 Although there is heavy 
filtering regarding child pornography and illegal content, the filtering 
is the result of citizen action and reviewed by offline legislation.172  
3. Intellectual Property Law: United Kingdom 
Similar to the United States, the United Kingdom is also a 
member party of the Berne Convention, the WIPO and the WIPO 
Treaty.173 Consequently, the United Kingdom is required to 
implement legal protection and effective legal remedies against the 
circumvention of effective technological measures.174 As a member of 
the European Union, the United Kingdom has implemented the bloc’s 
directives into their repertoire of intellectual property laws.175  
The E-Commerce Directive establishes transparency and 
information requirements for online service providers, and a 
intermediary liability system.176 Section 4, Articles 12 to 15 of the 
Directive establish the framework for intermediary liability in the 
form of a “notice-and-action” system.177  
                                                            
171. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text (describing that the United 
Kingdom has traditionally operated a libertarian approach in respects to the Internet). 
172. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text (describing the IWF’s assessment of 
reported content in accords to “offline” laws). 
173. The United Kingdom ratified the Berne Convention on September 5, 1887. See 
WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROPERTY ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/
en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15 (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (providing a list of the 
members of the Berne Convention). The United Kingdom ratified the WIPO Treaty on 
December 14, 2009. See WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROPERTY ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=16 (last visited Dec. 30, 
2014) (list of WIPO Treaty parties). 
174. WIPO Treaty, supra note 109, art. 11. 
175. The United Kingdom implemented the EU E-Commerce Directive by enacting the 
Electronic Commerce Regulations of 2002. See The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) 
Regulations, 2002, S.I. 2001/2555 (U.K.). 
176. See Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament on Certain Legal Aspects of 
Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market 
(Directive on Electronic Commerce), 2000 O.J. L 178/1 [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive]; 
E-Commerce Directive, Introduction to the Directive, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/directive/index_en.htm#maincontentSec1 (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2014) (providing an overview of the E-Commerce Directive). 
177. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 177, § 12, art. 12-15; see Notice-and-Action 
Procedures, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/notice-
and-action/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (providing an overview of the E-
Commerce Directive’s notice-and-action procedure). 
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Pursuant to Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive, providers 
that store third party content on their servers may not be held liable 
for the content unless the service provider fails to expeditiously 
remove or block access to the content upon obtaining actual 
knowledge of the content’s illegality or upon becoming aware of facts 
or circumstances that indicate illegal activity.178 Similar to the 
criticisms of the DMCA in the United States, there are concerns that 
the E-Commerce Directive’s notice-and-action procedure possibly 
chills freedom of expression.179 Critics argue that because service 
providers risk liability if the content is not expeditiously removed, it 
is likely that host service providers will systematically take down any 
alleged unlawful material when a notification is received.180 
Moreover, unlike the DMCA, the E-Commerce Directive does not 
require Member States to implement “put back” procedures.181  
 Following the footsteps of New Zealand and France, the United 
Kingdom enacted the Digital Economy Act 2010 (“DEA”), a 
graduated response law.182 The DEA establishes the framework of the 
law, and delegates the implementation and specific details to be later 
drafted by the Office of Communications (“OFCOM”) in an Initial 
Obligations Code.183 Under the DEA, once a copyright holder files a 
copyright infringement report, the ISP is required to notify the 
reported subscriber to cease the illegal activity and offer the 
                                                            
178. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 177, § 12, art. 14 (explaining hosting liability). 
179. See Rosa Julià-Barceló & Kamiel J. Koelman, Intermediary Liability In The E-
Commerce Directive: So Far So Good, But It's Not Enough, 16 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY 
REV. 231, 234-39 (2000) (arguing that the E-Commerce Directive threatens freedom of speech 
and fair competition); see also Pablo Baistrocchi, Liability of Intermediary Service Providers 
in the EU Directive on Electronic Commerce 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J 
111, 130 (2002) (discussing that the loopholes in the directive present an impracticable future). 
180. See Julià-Barceló & Koelman, supra note 179, at 231 (explaining that on-line 
intermediaries have an incentive to systematically take down material without hearing from the 
party whose material is removed); infra notes  275-92 and accompanying text (discussing 
similar effects on Internet speech by the DMCA).  
181. “Put back” procedures are the processes of putting the alleged infringing material 
back on the website after going through the statutorily enumerated or court ordered processes. 
See Baistrocchi, supra note 180, at 125 (arguing that the E-Commerce Directive should 
implement “put back” procedures); Julià-Barceló & Koelman, supra note 180, at 238-39 
(calling for Member States to implement appropriate procedures on notice, take-down and “put 
back”). 
182. As the name suggests, a graduated response law incorporates escalating sanctions 
for repeated offenders. See Digital Economy Act, 2010, c. 24 (U.K.) [hereinafter DEA]. 
183. See DEA, §§ 5-6 (U.K.). Sections 5 & 6 of the DEA establishes the process and 
requirements for approval of the initial obligations code. See id. Section 7 establishes the 
skeleton framework for DEA and leaves the details to OFCOM. See id. § 7.  
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subscriber advice on how to prevent further infractions of the law.184 
Pursuant to § 4, ISPs are required to maintain a list of subscribers who 
have reached the OFCOM-determined threshold number of 
infringements.185 This list must also be provided to copyright holders 
upon their request.186 One potentially troubling aspect of the DEA is 
that repeat offenders risk facing increasing sanctions that may limit or 
even cut off their Internet connection.187  
In July 2010, TalkTalk, a UK ISP, joined BT in seeking the 
judicial review of the DEA, arguing that the act was rushed through 
parliament before the general election and without proper 
consideration of its effect on human rights and businesses.188 On 
November 10, 2010, the High Court of Justice, the UK court that 
hears appeals and first instance cases, granted review permission.189 
The High Court ruled in favor of the government on April 20, 
2011.190 High Court Judge Kenneth Parker considered the DEA "a 
more efficient, focused, and fair system than the current 
arrangement.”191 On March 6, 2012, TalkTalk and BT lost their final 
appeal against the implementation of the DEA.192  
                                                            
184. See id. § 3. 
185. See id. § 4. 
186. See id. 
187. See id. § 9; see also Robert Andrews, Digital Economy Bill: A Quick Guide, THE 
GUARDIAN, (Apr. 8, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/media/pda/2010/apr/08/digital-
economy-bill-quick-guide-45-measures (discussing the main points of the DEA). 
188. BT and TalkTalk Challenge Digital Economy Act, BBC (July 8, 2010), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/10542400 (“The act became law shortly before parliament was dissolved 
in the so-called wash-up period. It meant it was subject to a shorter debate than other acts”); 
Josh Halliday, BT and TalkTalk Granted Judicial Review of Digital Economy Act, THE 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 10, 2010, 9:20 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/nov/10/
bt-talktalk-digital-economy-act (reporting that both broadband providers was granted review 
of the act at the high court to clarify whether it conflicts with existing EU legislation). 
189. Halliday, supra note 189 (reporting that the High Court of Justice granted review 
permission); Digital Economy Act to Be Reviewed by Courts and Parliament, OUT-LAW.COM 
(Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.out-law.com/page-11538 (“The High Court has said that it will 
review the law to see if it is in conflict with EU laws on privacy and ISPs' liabilities for users' 
behaviour.”). 
190.  See R v. Sec’y of State for Bus., Innovation and Skills, [2011] EWHC (Admin) 
1021 (U.K.); see also Digital Economy Act Judicial Review, GOV.UK (Apr. 20, 2011), https://
www.gov.uk/government/news/digital-economy-act-judicial-review (reporting that UK Justice 
Kenneth Parker upheld the principle of taking measures to tackle the unlawful downloading 
copyright material).  
191. R v. Sec’y of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, [2011] EWHC (Admin) 
1021, [H9] (U.K.) (holding that the DEA is not disproportionate restriction on right to free 
expression or to impart and receive information); see Andrew Orlowski, What Now for the 
Anti-Piracy Law?, THE REG. (Apr. 21 2011), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/04/21/
856 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:825 
D. China: Isolation Behind the Great Firewall 
The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China establishes 
the framework and principles of government and enumerates the 
rights of Chinese citizens.193 Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution 
provides that “[c]itizens of the [PRC] enjoy freedom of speech, of the 
press, of assembly, of association, of recession and of 
demonstration.”194 Similar to the United States, China’s constitutional 
protection of freedom of expression is not absolute.195 The PRC’s 
Constitution expressly limits freedoms that infringe upon the interests 
of the state, society, or other citizens.196 Moreover, government 
regulations further restrict the freedom of speech, such as the 
Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Administration 
of Audio-Visual Products, and the Regulations on Broadcasting and 
Television Administration, which prohibit the distribution and 
                                                                                                                                     
digital_economy_act_high_court/ (reporting that High Justice Parker repeatedly disagreed with 
the objecting ISP’s interpretation of the Act). 
192. See Kelly Fiveash, BT, TalkTalk Lose Final Appeal Against Digital Economy Act, 
THE REG. (Mar. 6, 2012, 10:24 AM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/03/06/bt_talktalk
_lose_final_appeal_against_digital_economy_act/ (reporting that Lady Justice Arden, Lord 
Justice Richards and Lord Justice Patten al upheld the High Court's earlier judgment on all 
grounds other than on the matter of costs); Josh Halliday, BT and TalkTalk Lose Challenge 
Against Digital Economy Act, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2012/mar/06/Internet-provider-lose-challenge-digital-economy-act (reporting that 
the government can begin implementing the Digital Economy Act). 
193.  See Guosong Shao, The Chinese Legal System, in INTERNET LAW OF CHINA, 1, 2 
(2012) (discussing the background information of the Chinese legal system); see also Robert 
Koeze & Thomas Rimmer, Constitutional Law, CHINA GUIDING CASES PROJECT, available at 
http://cgc.law.stanford.edu/english-law-summaries/constitutional-law/ (last visited Dec. 30, 
2014) (providing an overview of the PRC’s Constitution). See generally XIANFA (1982) 
(China) (enumerating the rights of citizens and establishing the framework for the judicial, 
legislative and executive branch). 
194. XIANFA art. 35 (2004) (China) (“A citizen of the People’s Republic of China has 
right to the freedom of speech, of press, of assembly, of procession and of demonstration.”). 
Since the PRC was found in 1949, the National People’s Congress has adopted four 
constitutions, all of which provided for the protection of the freedom of expression. See James 
Liu, China, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/
111803/China/258953/Constitutional-framework (last visited Apr. 5, 2015) (providing a 
general overview of China’s consitutitonal history). 
195. See XIANFA art. 51 (2004) (China); Guosong Shao, Internet Speech, in INTERNET 
LAW OF CHINA, 49, 49-53 (2012) [hereinafter Shao, Internet Speech] (explaining that the PRC 
Constitution stipulates that a citizen’s exercise of their freedoms and rights may not infringe 
upon the interest of the state, society, and other citizens). 
196. See XIANFA art. 51 (2004) (China); Shao, Internet Speech, supra note 195, at 49-53 
(describing the enumerated limitations on speech). 
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broadcast of matters that endanger the nation’s unity and sovereignty, 
and territorial integrity, respectively.197  
1. Regulations from the Down Up 
The Internet presents the Chinese government with the 
conundrum of maintaining economic growth provided by the 
Internet’s global reach while preserving its political and ideological 
control free from international influences.198 Internet activity in China 
is regulated through infrastructure and the legal framework, involving 
various government agencies and criminal or financial sanctions.199  
The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (“MIIT”) 
regulates telecommunications, such as the Internet, and oversees 
telecommunication regulatory agencies in all Chinese provinces, 
autonomous regions, and municipalities.200 In addition, similar to the 
United States, the Internet is regulated by different agencies based on 
                                                            
197. See Shao, Internet Speech, supra note 195, at 53 (detailing the numerous laws and 
regulations that restrict speech); see, e.g., Yinxiang Zhipin Guanli Tiaoli Shixiao 
(音像制品管理条例[失效) [Regulations on the Administration of Audio and Video Products] 
(promulgated by the State Council, Dec. 25, 2001, effective Dec. 7, 2013) (Lawinfochina) 
(China) (prohibiting the distribution of in audio-visual products that may endanger the “unity 
and territorial integrity of the nation and sovereignty of the State;”); Guangbo Dianshi Guanli 
Tiaoli (广播电视管理条例) [Regulations on Broadcasting and Television Administration] 
(promulgated by the State Council, Aug. 11, 1997, effective Sept. 1, 1997) (Lawinfochina) 
(China) (prohibiting broadcasting stations from producing or broadcasting content that 
endangers the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country); Chuban Guanli Tiaoli 
(出版管理条例) [Regulations on the Administration of Publication] (promulgated by the State 
Council, Dec. 25, 2001, effective Feb. 1, 2002) (Lawinfochina) (China) (prohibiting the 
publication of any content that includes, inter alia, the propagation of evil cults or superstition 
and content that disturbs public order or public stability).  
198. See Xiaoru Wang, Behind the Great Firewall: The Internet and Democratization of 
China (2009) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with University 
of Michigan Library) (explaining that China’s extensive Internet censorship is a result of the 
government attempting to maintain ideological control); see also, Shao, supra note 196, at 58-
81 (describing China’s attempt to restrict Internet speech that may endanger national security 
and stability). 
199. See Aaron D. McGeary, China's Great Balancing Act: Maximizing the Internet's 
Benefits While Limiting Its Detriments, 35 Int'l Law. 219, 224-30 (2001) (describing the PRC’s 
efforts to regulate the Internet). See generally Guosong Shao, Regulating the Internet, in 
INTERNET LAW OF CHINA, 25, 30-44 (2012) [hereinafter Shao, Regulating the Internet) 
(describing the various methods that People’s Republic of China employs to regulate the 
Internet). 
200. See Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra note 199, at 31 (explaining that according 
to PRC Telecommunications Regulations, the Internet is part of the telecommunications 
business); see also Major Responsibilities, CHINESE GOVERNMENT’S OFFICIAL WEB PORTAL, 
http://www.gov.cn/english//2005-10/02/content_74176.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) 
(explaining the role of the MIIT). 
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the specific Internet activity.201 For instance, China’s General 
Administration of Press and Publication (“GAPP”) regulates Internet 
publishing, and the State Administration of Radio Film and 
Television (“SARFT”) regulates websites providing audio-visual 
programs.202 
In addition to the involvement of various agencies, numerous 
laws regulate behavior and content on the Internet.203 For instance, 
unlike the United States and the United Kingdom, the MIIT has 
established regulations with strict intermediary liability for Internet 
content providers, bulletin board systems, or other user-generated 
content sites, for the content published on their sites.204 Under the 
National People’s Congress (“NPC”) Standing Committee’s Decision 
on Preserving Computer Network Security, citizens are forbidden 
from using the Internet to incite secession, divulge state secrets, 
advocate for the overthrow of state power and the socialist system, 
provoke ethnic hatred or discrimination, or to propagate violent 
resistance to law enforcement.205  
                                                            
201. See Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra note 199, at 31 ((describing the roles of the 
government agencies); Agencies Responsible for Censorship in China, Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, http://www.cecc.gov/agencies-responsible-for-censorship-
in-china (last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (detailing the various agencies that are responsible for 
China’s censorship). 
202. See Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra note 199, at 31 ((describing the roles of 
GAPP and SARFT in regards to the internet); Agencies Responsible for Censorship in China, 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, http://www.cecc.gov/agencies-responsible-
for-censorship-in-china (last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (detailing the various agencies that are 
responsible for China’s censorship). 
203. See infra notes 204-09 (detailing various laws that regulate the Internet in China). 
204. See Hulianwang Dianzi Gongao Fuwu Guanli (互联网电子公告服务管理规定) 
[Management Provisions on Electronic Bulletin Services in Internet] (promulgated by the 
Ministry of Information and Industry, Nov. 6 2000, effective Nov. 6, 2000) (Lawinfochina) 
(China) (requiring service providers that find illegal content listed in their system to 
immediately delete the content, keep relevant records, and report the findings to the 
authorities); ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING 
265 (Jonathan Zittrain et al. eds., 2008) (noting that Internet content providers are directly 
responsible for what is published on their site); see also Internet Intermediaries, supra note 18, 
at 7 (explaining that China has adopted a strict intermediary liability approach). 
205.  Quanguo Rwn Da Chang Weihuì Guanyu Weihu Hulianwang Anquan De Juedìng 
(全国人大常委会关于维护互联网安全的决定) [Decision of the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress on Preserving Computer Network Security] (promulgated by 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Dec. 28, 2000, effective Dec. 28, 
2000) (Lawinfochina) (China) [hereinafter Decision on Preserving Computer Network 
Security] (prohibiting specified conduct on the Internet); see Shao, Internet Speech, supra note 
195, at 73 (referring to the regulation as the “Decision on Safeguarding Internet Security” as 
an acceptable alternative translation of the title).  
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In an effort to protect children and moral values, the PRC further 
prohibits the production and dissemination of pornographic 
materials.206 The Criminal Law defines pornography as “materials 
that explicitly describe sexual conduct or blatantly appeal to the 
prurient interests.”207 The Decision on Preserving Computer Network 
Security extends the prohibition of pornography to the Internet by 
criminalizing the establishment of pornographic websites and 
services.208 This expansion to the Internet has prompted the Supreme 
People’s Court, the highest court in the PRC, and the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate, the highest prosecutorial agency, to publish 
judicial interpretation guidelines in order to clarify the standard for 
criminal liability, and to delineate the factors for determining whether 
a website is pornographic.209  
                                                            
206. China’s prohibition of pornography can be traced to the 1979 revision of China’s 
Criminal Law. See Shao, Internet Speech, supra note 195, at 73 (explaining the history of 
PRC’s prohibition of pornography); see Ningzhu Zhu, Porn Crackdown Crucial to Cyber 
Development: Experts, XINHUA NEWS (Apr. 16, 2014), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
china/2014-04/16/c_133267415.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2014) ((quoting Han Jun, Deputy 
Dean of the School of Journalism and Communication at Northwest University) (“[r]ampant 
pornography has disrupted social order and tainted the image of the country as a whole, casting 
a bad influence on the public, particularly minors”)). 
207.  Section 9 Article 367 prohibits the production, sale or dissemination of obscene 
materials, with the exception of scientific products, literary, and artistic works. Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (97 Xiuding) (中华人民共和国刑法 (97修订)) [Criminal Law of 
the People's Republic of China (97 Revision)] (promulgated by National People's Congress, 
Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1 1997) (Lawinfochina) (China) [hereinafter Criminal Law].  
208. See Decision on Preserving Computer Network Security, supra note 213, § 3(5) 
(prohibiting the establishment of pornographic web sites); see also Shao, Internet Speech, 
supra note 196, at 86-89 (explaining China’s attempts to prohibit pornography). 
209. The 2010 Interpretation was a revision of the original Supreme People’s Courts 
interpretation issued in 2004. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan 
Guanyu Banli Liyong Hulianwang, Yidong Tongxun Zhongduan, Shengxuntai Zhizuo, Fuzhi, 
Chuban, Fanmai, Chuanbo Yinhui Dianzi Xinxi Xingshi Anjian Juti Yìngyong Falu Ruogan 
Wentí De Jieshi (最高人民法院、最高人民检察院关于办理利用互联网、移动通讯终端
、声讯台制作、复制、出版、贩卖、传播淫秽电子信息刑事案件具体应用法律若干问题
的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate 
on Several Issues Concerning the Concrete Application of Law in the Handling of Criminal 
Cases of Making, Reproducing, Publishing, Selling and Spreading Pornographic Electronic 
Information by Means of the Internet, Terminal of Mobile Communications and Sound 
Message Stations] (promulgated by Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate 
Feb. 2, 2010, effective Feb. 4, 2010) (Lawinfochina) (China) [hereinafter 2010 Judicial 
Interpretation] (interpreting the application of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of 
China and Decision on Computer Network Security in respect to online pornography).  
860 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:825 
Furthermore, the PRC prohibits the propagation of cults on the 
Internet.210 While the Chinese Constitution provides a right to 
religion, the People’s Supreme Court defines a cult as an illegal 
organization that hides behind religion, Qigong, or other supernatural 
beliefs.211 In addition, the PRC treats cults as organizations that intend 
to jeopardize public order and social stability.212 The emergence of 
the Internet has provided these alleged cults with new avenues to 
spread their message to a wider audience.213 For instance, in 1999 the 
Chinese government banned the Falun Gong, an organization 
practicing Qigong, an ancient Chinese practice that integrates 
physical postures, breathing techniques, and meditation.214 Since then, 
                                                            
210. Decision on Preserving Computer Network Security, supra note 213, § 2(4) 
(criminalizing the “use of the computer network to form cult organizations or contact members 
of cult organizations . . . .”); Article 300 of the Criminal Law prohibits people from using cult 
organizations or superstitions to undermine law enforcement. Criminal Law, supra note 207, 
art. 300. 
211. XINFA art. 36 (stating that no organization or individual may compel citizens to 
believe in, or not to believe in, any religion). The right to religious practice in China is limited. 
See Religious Freedom in China, BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE, AND WORLD AFF. 
AT GEORGETOWN U., http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/religious-freedom-in-china 
(last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (describing the PRC’s regulation of religion within China). The 
government protects what it calls "normal religious activity," which is restricted to 
government-sanctioned religious organizations and registered places of worship. See id.. 
Zuigao Renmín Fayuan, Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan Guanyu Banli Zuzhi He Liyong Xiejiao 
Zuzhi Fanzuì Anjian Juti Yingyong Falu Ruogan Wentí De Jieshi 
(最高人民法院、最高人民检察院关于办理组织和利用邪教组织犯罪案件具体应用法律
若干问题的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's 
Procuratorate on the Concrete Application of Law on Handling the Cases of Committing 
Crimes by Organizing and Using Cult Organizations] (promulgated by Supreme People's 
Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, Oct. 9, 1999, effective Oct. 9, 1999) (Lawinfochina) 
(China) (interpreting the application of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China in 
regards to prosecution of cults and cultists) [hereinafter PRC Cult Regulation]; see also Shao, 
Internet Speech, supra note 195, at 90 (explaining China’s prohibition of cults). 
212. See PRC Cult Regulation, supra note 211 (defining the term cult).  
213. See James Tong, An Organizational Analysis of the Falun Gong: Structure, 
Communications, Financing, CHINA Q., Sept. 2002, at 639 (discussing how the Internet played 
a large role in spreading the Falungong’s message); see also Shao, Regulating the Internet, 
supra note 199, at 91 (explaining how Chinese cults have used the Internet to disseminate their 
views). 
214. What distinguishes the Falun Gong from typical Qigong practices is that the Falun 
Gong has deified their Qigong Master, Li Hongzhi. See Christopher Chaney, The Despotic 
State Department in Refugee Law: Creating Legal Fictions to Support Falun Gong Asylum 
Claims, 6 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 4 (2005) (discussing the Falun Gong’s deification of Li); 
see also Who is Li Hongzhi?, BBC (May 8, 2011) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/
1223317.stm (“Li Hongzhi, a former trumpet-player from north-east China, is known as 
‘Living Buddha’ to his devotees.”). 
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the Falun Gong has mainly used the Internet to circulate its doctrines, 
recruit members, and organize activities.215  
2. Behind the Great Firewall of China 
The PRC further exercises extensive control over its internal 
Internet architecture.216 Open Net Initiative, a joint project that 
examines and reports countries’ Internet filtering practices, reported 
that China’s filtering has grown continuously more refined, 
sophisticated, and targeted.217 China’s network is divided into two 
tiers, the backbone networks and the access networks.218 The 
backbone networks run through internationally-leased circuits that 
connect China to international websites.219 In the United States and 
the United Kingdom, a significant percentage of backbone networks 
are operated and owned by private companies.220 However, in China, 
the original four backbone networks are controlled and monitored by 
various government agencies.221 Because Internet data enters China 
                                                            
215. See Shao, Internet Speech, supra note 195, at 91 (discussing cult’s use of the 
Internet in China); see also Tong, supra note 214, at 647 (describing the Falun Gong’s use of 
the Internet). 
216. See Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra note 199, at 42-46 (2012) (describing how 
the major telecommunications operations and Internet content providers are required to take 
measures to prevent the dissemination of illegal information on the Internet); Open Net 
Initiative, China, OPEN NET INITIATIVE 276-85 available at http://access.opennet.net/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/accesscontested-china.pdf (discussing the various technical filtering 
measures employed by the PRC).  
217. See Open Net Initiative, China, supra note 216, at 276-82 (“Despite the rapid 
spread of Internet access throughout its vast population, China also has one of the largest and 
most sophisticated Internet filtering systems in the world.”); Lee & Liu, supra note 71, at 129 
(describing the recent “extraordinary growth” in China’s Internet infrastructure). 
218. See Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra note 199, at 42 (describing the two-tier 
system); see also Lee & Liu, supra note 71, at 133 (noting that while filters have been installed 
on different layers of China's Internet, it has been constructed primarily at the backbone 
network). 
219. See Backbone Definition, COMPUTER HOPE, http://www.computerhope.com/jargon/
b/backbone.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (defining backbone network); Backbone 
Definition, TECHTERMS, http://www.techterms.com/definition/backbone (last visited Dec. 31, 
2014) (defining backbone network). 
220. See, e.g., Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 877 (noting that most of 
the relevant Internet infrastructure in America, such as the network backbone, routers, and 
access points, are privately owned); Christopher Williams, ISP Condemns New BT Backbone, 
THE REG. (July 1, 2010), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/07/01/aa_bt/ (last visited Dec. 30, 
2014) (reporting criticisms about BT’s backbones unable to handle current demand). 
221. See Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra note 199, at 42 (discussing several of 
backbone networks in China); China Mobile Users 2012, ONBILE (Jan. 25, 2013), http://
www.onbile.com/info/china-mobile-users-2012/ (discussing that individuals and businesses 
are only allowed to rent bandwidth from state networks). 
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through a limited set of entry points controlled by governmental 
agencies, the Chinese government is able to regulate the flow of 
information by controlling these entry points.222  
China’s backbone-level filtering system, officially designated 
the “Golden Shield Project” (金盾工程) is commonly referred to as 
the “Great Firewall of China,” a reference to the Great Wall of 
China.223 Unlike typical firewall systems, however, the Great Firewall 
of China forms a “virtual ring around an entire country.”224 The 
second tier of China’s network systems, the access networks, is a 
system of intermediate networks that connect through the backbone 
networks to the international Internet.225 All of China’s access 
networks are required to implement technical measures to prevent the 
dissemination of illegal and harmful information in cyberspace.226 For 
instance, access networks are required to record a customer’s account 
number, phone numbers, and IP address.227   
It is clear that maintaining national security and social stability 
are some of the PRC’s utmost important objectives.228 By regulating 
the Internet from the ground up, the PRC is able to control the data 
that enters and leaves its borders at the infrastructure level while 
maintaining compliance from its end-user citizens with their broad 
                                                            
222. See Kristen Farrell, The Big Mamas Are Watching: China's Censorship of the 
Internet and the Strain on Freedom of Expression, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 577, 585-86 (2007) 
(noting that the MIIT ensures that government control exists at every juncture); Lee & Liu, 
supra note 71, at 133 (discussing PRC’s attempts to control the limited Internet connection 
points). 
223. Similar to the Great Wall’s purpose to defend against marauding invaders, the Great 
Firewall denotes China’s attempt to block undesirable content from its “netizens.” See Lee & 
Liu, supra note 70, at 133 (describing the firewall project); Jennifer Shyu, Speak No Evil: 
Circumventing Chinese Censorship, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211, 225-28 (2008)] (describing 
the goals of the firewall project); see also Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 876 
(discussing PRC’s implementation of filters at access point). 
224. See Lee & Liu, supra note 70, at 133 (describing the firewall’s pervasive filtering); 
Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra note 199, at 43 (explaining the different ways the Golden 
Shield Project can block information). 
225.  See Lee & Liu, supra note 71, at 133 (describing that the lower layer networks 
connect through the upper layer networks to the international networks); Shao, Regulating the 
Internet, supra note 199, at 42 (describing how China’s Internet is divided into two tiers)  
226.  See supra notes 223-25 (explaining the technical measures utilized at the backbone 
level); infra note 227 (explaining the measures implemented at access networks). 
227. See Farrell, supra note 222, at 586 (explaining that Internet Access Points must 
record a customer's account number, phone number and IP address); Open Net Initiative, 
China, supra note 16, at 284 (noting that Internet Information Service providers are required to 
store records for 60 days and provide records to authorities upon demand).  
228. See supra notes 206-15 and accompanying text (describing China’s attempt to 
regulate the Internet in furtherance of maintaining “social stability,” and “national security”). 
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censorship laws.229 China’s model of Internet censorship is evocative 
of Lawrence Lessig’s “code-is-law,” which provides that “code”—
i.e., software or hardware—can have a similar effect to the way legal 
regulation affects one’s behavior.230 Professor Lee and Professor Liu 
posit that, “one of the most profound consequences of [China’s 
Internet] architecture is not that it immediately limits citizens' access 
to sensitive foreign content, but that it is gradually shaping human 
behavior in cyberspace.”231 
It is clear that the censorship policies of the United States, 
United Kingdom, and China embody different philosophies and 
values.232 For instance, while each country appears to agree on 
protecting children from inappropriate material, such as pornography, 
each country approaches the problem differently.233 The United States 
regulates the Internet through legislative attempts.234 The United 
Kingdom passively designates a watchdog role to a nongovernment 
organization.235 China attempts to exercise near-complete domination 
over the Internet activity within its borders.236  
II. ARTICLE 19 ANALYSIS 
Part II of this Note analyzes each country’s Internet censorship 
model under Article 19 of the ICCPR. Section A will analyze the US 
legislative approach, specifically the possible conflicts of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act with Article 19. Section B examines 
                                                            
229. See supra notes 199-227 and accompanying text (explaining China’s holistic 
approach to Internet censorship). 
230. See Lawrence Lessig, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, VERSION 2.0 5 
(2006) (discussing how code regulates behavior on cyberspace); see also Lee & Liu, supra 
note 70, at 26 (utilizing Lessig’s theory, Professors Lee and Professor Liu analyzes China’s 
censorship scheme’s effect on its citizen). 
231. Professor Jyh-An Lee is an Assistant Professor of Law at National Chengchi 
University, Taiwan. Professor Ching-Yi Liu is a Professor of Law at National Taiwan 
University, Taiwan. See Lee & Liu, supra note 70, at 145. 
232. Compare supra notes 77-141 (discussing the United States’ legislative model), with 
supra notes 142-192 (discussing the United Kingdom’s approach to Internet regulations), and 
supra notes 199-227 (detailing the PRC’s control over their internal Internet activities). 
233. Compare supra notes 79-106 (discussing CDA, COPA, and CIPA), with supra 
notes 151-65 (discussing the role of the IWF), and supra notes 207-10 (detailing the PRC’s 
prohibition of pornography). 
234. See supra notes 79-141 (describing the various legislative attempts to censor 
Internet content). 
235. See supra notes 147-67 (discussing the United Kingdom’s support of the IWF). 
236. See supra notes 199-227 (explaining the PRC’s extensive control of internal 
Internet use). 
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Article 19’s compatibility with the United Kingdom’s cooperation 
with the Internet Watch Foundation, and the United Kingdom’s recent 
adoption of the Digital Economy Act. Finally, as the PRC has not 
ratified the ICCPR, Section C will look at the potential Article 19 
violations committed by the PRC’s extensive manipulation and 
regulation of the Internet. As expected, no nation has a perfect model 
of Internet censorship. This analysis will, however, provide a better 
understanding of the strengths and possible deficiencies of applying 
Article 19 to the Internet. 
Whether a restriction is considered permissible inevitably evokes 
a struggle among respect of state sovereignty, cultural and moral 
differences, and promotion of individual human rights.237 This 
struggle is evident in Hertzberg v. Finland, in which the HRC could 
not find an Article 19 violation in a Finnish broadcaster’s decision to 
censor two programs involving homosexuality. 238 The HRC noted 
that public morals differ widely between countries and that there is no 
universally common standard of morality.239 Therefore, “a certain 
margin of discretion must be accorded to the responsible national 
authorities.”240 Despite the lack of success after Hertzberg, State 
parties have continued to argue for a “margin of discretion” in HRC 
cases.241 
The Internet is arguably unlike any of its predecessors, and the 
vast potential and benefits of the Internet are the result of its unique 
characteristics, such as its unparalleled speed, ubiquity, and relative 
                                                            
237. See Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 61/1979, Leo Hertzberg et al. v. Finland, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1985) [hereinafter Human Rights Comm., Hertzberg Commc’n] 
(holding that public morals differ); Carlson, supra note 26, at 122-23 (explaining that 
application of Article 19(3) is uneven). 
238. See Human Rights Comm., Hertzberg Commc’n, supra note 239, ¶ 2.1.  
239. See Human Rights Comm., Hertzberg Commc’n, supra note 238, ¶ 10.3; see also 
Ambika Kumar, Using Courts to Enforce the Free Speech Provisions of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 351, 353 (2006) (discussing how the 
Human Rights Committee has adjudicated Article 19 matters inconsistently); Carlson, supra 
note 18, at 122 (explaining the significance of Hertzberg). 
240.  Human Rights Comm., Hertzberg Commc’n, supra note 238, ¶ 10.3. 
241. See Andrew Legg, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 131 (2012) (stating that states have continued to make the case for deference 
before the HRC)). But see SARAH JOSEPH & JENNY SCHULTZ, et al., THE INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 527 (2d ed. 2004) (describing that after 
Hertzberg, the HRC has never disposed any other Article 19 case by reference to the State 
Party’s “margin of discretion”); but see also Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 511/1992, 
Länsman et al. v. Finland, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994) (unwilling to assess an 
Article 27 violation by reference to a margin of appreciation). 
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anonymity.242 The Special Rapporteur recognized that due to their 
very nature, many regulations or restrictions that may be legitimate 
and proportionate for traditional media, such as defamation laws, are 
often not as effective with regards to the Internet.243  
While governments typically agree that Internet content should 
be regulated, their norms justifying filtering differ widely.244 For 
instance, people from the United States would likely disapprove of 
Saudi Arabia’s pervasive filtering predicated on Shari’ah law.245 
However, Saudi Arabian residents might similarly object to US 
tolerance of pornography and alcohol consumption.246  
Even among democratic countries, justifications for content-
restriction diverge.247 This contrast in norms is evident in the case 
Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisémitisme v. Yahoo!, Inc.248 In 2000, 
Yahoo! operated a United States-based auction page, targeted towards 
Americans, that posted Nazi memorabilia for auction.249 However, the 
French Criminal Code prohibits the sale of Nazi memorabilia.250 
Article R645-1 criminalizes the display of uniforms, insignias, or 
emblems that are associated with “organizations responsible for 
crimes against humanity,” which are not being used for the purposes 
of a movie, show, or historical pageant.251 Because anyone from 
                                                            
242. See The Internet: Challenges, Opportunities and Prospects, INT’L TELECOMM. 
UNION (May 17, 2001), http://www.itu.int/newsarchive/wtd/2001/ExecutiveSummary.html 
(reporting on the prospective benefits of the Internet); August 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 
52, at 5 (noting the unprecedented level of communication provided by the Internet). 
243. The Special Rapporteur used the example of defamation of an individual’s 
reputation. See May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 52, at 8. (“[G]iven the ability of the 
individual concerned to exercise his/her right of reply instantly to restore the harm caused, the 
types of sanctions that are applied to offline defamation may be unnecessary or 
disproportionate.”). 
244. See infra notes 246-47 (providing an example of justifications for Internet 
regulations based on different cultural norms).  
245. See Internet Rules, 2001, Council of Ministers Resolution (Feb. 12, 2001), (Saudi 
Arabia) available at http://www.al-bab.com/media/docs/saudi.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) 
(proscribing specific Internet activities and content) [hereinafter Saudi Internet Rules]; Internet 
Filtering in Saudi Arabia, OPENNET INITIATIVE, https://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/
ONI_SaudiArabia_2009.pdf (last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (reporting the extent of Internet 
filtering in Saudi Arabia). 
246. See supra Part I.B (discussing the United States’ model of Internet regulation).  
247. See infra notes 248-54 (discussing the controversy in Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue 
Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
248. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 
1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2006) (providing the background of the French Superior Court case). 
249. See id. at 1202. 
250. See CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. R645-1 (Fr.). 
251. Id. 
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France can visit the Yahoo! auction, the plaintiffs, the League Against 
Racism and Anti-Semitism, argued that Yahoo! was in violation of 
Article R645-1 of the French Penal Code.252  
Upon finding that Yahoo! Inc. had violated the Article R645-1, 
the Superior Court of Paris ordered Yahoo! Inc. to take measures that 
would prevent French Internet users from receiving Nazi content.253 
While Yahoo! France, Yahoo! Inc.’s French subsidiary, was quick to 
follow the French Court’s order, Yahoo! Inc.’s US office resisted the 
French order and filed suit in US District Court for the Northern 
District of California seeking a declaratory judgment that the French 
Court Order was unenforceable in the United States.254 This case 
illustrates the possible conflicts produced by divergent norms and 
laws, and the Internet’s border-defying nature.255  
There are currently a variety of theories on the government’s 
role vis-à-vis the Internet.256 For instance, cyber-libertarians, such as 
John Perry Barlow, argue that access to content on the Internet should 
remain unfettered.257 Other scholars, such as Thomas Schultz, espouse 
a Helgian-model, arguing that sovereign nations must safeguard local 
values through filtering mechanisms.258 Recognizing the deficiencies 
in current theoretical approaches to Internet filtering, Professor 
Bambauer proposes that censorship practices should be evaluated 
                                                            
252. See Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1202 (discussing LICRA’s cease and desist letter to 
Yahoo!, Inc). 
253. See id. at 1202. 
254. See id. at 1224 (holding that action was subject to dismissal because the issue was 
unripe). 
255. See supra notes 248-54 (discussing the conflict between the countries’ differing 
norms of freedom of expression). 
256. See infra notes 257-59 (describing different views regarding the government’s role 
vis-à-vis the Internet). 
257. In his 1996 work, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, John Perry 
Barlow prophetically conveys the current struggles governments encounter with regulating the 
Internet. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (1996), http://
homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (“Your legal concepts of property, expression, 
identity, movement, and context do not apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there is 
no matter here.”); see also Philip Elmer-Dewitt, First Nation in Cyberspace, TIME, Dec. 6, 
1993, at 62 (quoting John Gilmore) (“The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes 
around it.")). 
258. See Thomas Schultz, Carving up the Internet: Jurisdiction, Legal Orders, and the 
Private/Public International Law Interface, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 799, 806-10 (2008) (proposing 
a social-contract justification for filtering the Internet). 
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along the process-based metric of openness, transparency, 
narrowness, and accountability.259 
A. Article 19 Analysis of the United States: What to do with the 
DMCA? 
The cumulative test of Article 19(3) encompasses principles of 
predictability and transparency.260 Openness and transparency of 
government are often considered key pillars of a democratic 
society.261 In a 2009 memorandum, President Obama instructed the 
head of executive agencies to focus on three principles of an open 
government: (1) transparency, (2) participation, and (3) 
collaboration.262 The memo requires, among other things, executive 
departments and agencies to: publish government information online; 
improve the quality of government information; create an 
environment conducive to transparency, participation, and 
collaboration on ongoing projects; and reform policy framework to 
realize the potential of technology.263  
US laws regarding Internet governance, whether through cases 
or regulations, are readily available to the public.264 The effects of 
                                                            
259. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 390-410 (2009) (establishing a 
framework for analyzing the legitimacy of a country’s censorship system); Bambauer, Orwell's 
Armchair, supra note 10, at 900-43 (utilizing the framework to examine the legitimacy of soft 
censorship systems). 
260. See Land, supra note 48, at 426 (explaining Article 19(3) restrictions); May 2011 
La Rue Report, supra note 53, at 8 (explaining the three-part cumulative test). 
261. See JON GANT AND NICOLE TURNER-LEE, GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY: SIX 
STRATEGIES FOR MORE OPEN AND PARTICIPATORY GOVERNMENT, 13-15 (2011) (“A core 
pillar of democratic society is the interaction between government and the governed.”); cf. 
August 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 52, at 6 (reporting that the Internet can primarily be 
used as a positive tool to increase transparency over the conduct of those in power, access 
diverse sources of information, facilitate active citizen participation in building democratic 
societies). 
262. See Memorandum from the Office of Mgmt and Budget on Open Gov’t Directive to 
the Head Executive Dep’ts and Agencies (Dec. 8, 2009), available at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf (“The three 
principles of transparency, participation, and collaboration form the cornerstone of an open 
government) [hereinafter Open Directive]; Memorandum from the Office of Press Sec’y on 
Transparency and Open Gov’t to the Head Executive Dep’ts and Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009), 
available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20090121/2009_transparency_memo.pdf 
(directing the Chief of the Office of Management and Budget to coordinate with Executive 
agencies to implement the Open Directive). 
263. See Open Directive, supra note 263, at 2-8 (establishing the plans to implement the 
Open Directive). 
264. There have been numerous Acts passed to increase government transparency. For 
instance, the Freedom of Information Act and its amendments, allows full or partial disclosure 
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these laws on speech, however, are not always apparent. In 2010, 
Google launched its Transparency Report to “provide hard evidence 
of how laws and policies affect access to information online.”265 
Utilizing Google’s Transparency Reports, the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (“EFF”) compiled a list of takedowns that appear to 
involve possible misuse of the DMCA.266 The EFF’s findings are 
indicative of scholars’ apprehension of DMCA § 512.267 
The latter aspects of Article 19(3) involve principles of 
legitimacy, necessity, and proportionality. Attempts at “hard 
censorship” in the United States are often met with constitutional 
scrutiny. Recent landmark cases on Internet censorship demonstrate 
that the courts look to the proportionality of the regulation vis-à-vis 
the government interest and the legitimacy of the interest.268 Content-
based regulations are often strictly scrutinized.269 In order for the 
regulation to survive, the government must show that the limitation 
serves a compelling state interest and that the means employed are 
necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.270  
Restrictions on speech may not be overbroad.271 In Reno, Justice 
Steven’s opinion noted that the government failed to state why a less 
                                                                                                                                     
of previously unreleased government information and documents. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 
(2009). Moreover, the United States codifies its statutes and regularly publishes its courts 
opinions.  
265. See TRANSPARENCY REPORT, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
transparencyreport/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (providing reports about takedown requests 
that Google receives). 
266. See Parker Higgins, Top 10 Takedowns in Google's Copyright Transparency 
Report, Electronic Frontier Found. (July 5, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/07/top-
10-takedowns-googles-copyright-transparency-report (noting that these dubious takedown 
show that the DMCA's notice-and-takedown procedures are ripe for abuse). 
267. See infra notes 275-92 (examining the indirect chilling effects caused by § 512). 
268. See supra notes 80-94 (examining United States Supreme Court cases involving 
CDA §223 and COPA). 
269. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 829 
(1995) (noting that the government must abstain from regulating speech when “the specific 
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the 
restriction.”). 
270. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1999) aff'd, 217 F.3d 
162 (3d Cir. 2000) vacated sub nom., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (explaining that 
the government may regulate the content of such protected speech to promote a compelling 
governmental interest if the government chooses the least restrictive means to further the 
articulated interest). 
271. See UN General Comment 34, supra note 50, at 8 (“Restrictions must not be 
overbroad.”); August 2011 La Rue, supra note 52, at 6 (discussing that any restrictions must 
be formulated with specific precision). 
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restrictive provision would not be as effective as the CDA.272 
Similarly, in Ashcroft, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence suggested that 
COPA was likely overbroad and would not survive a constitutional 
challenge since content-based regulations like COPA are 
presumptively invalid abridgments of speech.273 US First Amendment 
jurisprudence remains a safeguard against government attempts at 
hard censorship. 
While the US Constitution constrains legislative attempts at hard 
censorship, soft censorship schemes, such as the DMCA, continue to 
evade constitutional scrutiny.274 Although the DMCA does not 
expressly limit freedom of expression, the chilling effect is 
apparent.275 Recognizing an intermediary’s inclination to err on the 
side of safety by over-censoring, Special Rapporteur La Rue advised 
that intermediaries may not be in the best position to make 
determinations of the legality of particular content.276 This 
determination requires careful balancing of competing interests and 
consideration of defenses.277 In a 2011 Joint Declaration, the Special 
Rapporteurs declared, “intermediaries should not be required to 
monitor user-generated content” and should not be subject to 
                                                            
272. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 879 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The breadth of 
this content-based restriction of speech imposes an especially heavy burden on the 
Government to explain why a less restrictive provision would not be as effective as the CDA. 
It has not done so.”). 
273. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 591 (2002) (“There is a very real likelihood that 
the . . . [COPA] is overbroad and cannot survive such a challenge. Indeed, content-based 
regulations like this one are presumptively invalid abridgments of the freedom of speech.”). 
274. See Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 890 (arguing that content 
restrictions via the spending power generally enables the soft censorship to survive First 
Amendment scrutiny); Seltzer, supra note 116, at 176 (arguing that the indirect nature of the 
chill on speech should not shield the DMCA from challenge). 
275. See infra notes 283-92 (describing the chilling effects caused by § 512). 
276. See May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 52, at 12 (arguing that the lack of 
transparency in the intermediaries’ decision-making process obscures discriminatory practices 
or political pressure affecting the companies’ decisions); cf. Seltzer, supra note 117, at 181 
(noting that because the service provider does not share all the benefits of the poster, the 
service provider lacks a similarly strong incentive to take risks in defending posted material in 
the face of a complaint). 
277. See May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 52, at 12 (arguing that intermediaries may 
not be in the best position to balance competing interests and consideration of defenses); 
Seltzer, supra note 116, at 229 (arguing for an alternative approach that limits takedowns to 
claimed commercial appropriation of entire works and requires proof to be submitted along 
with the notification). 
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extrajudicial takedowns which fail to provide sufficient protection for 
freedom of expression.278  
It is debatable whether the current DMCA counter-notification 
process provides sufficient protection for freedom of expression.279 
Despite its purpose to protect copyrights, some critics argue that the 
DMCA’s “notice-and-takedown” regime has a chilling effect on 
freedom of expression.280 For example, the report of suspected 
terrorist organizations using DMCA takedowns of YouTube videos 
critical of Islam in efforts to obtain the uploader’s name and address 
is troubling.281 One critic notes that the notice-and-takedown regime 
shares many of the hallmarks of prior restraints on speech because the 
notice-and-takedowns are imposed to limit speech before any formal 
adjudication on the merits of the copyright claims.282 
Because of the relatively low costs to claimants and the 
expectation of prompt takedowns, the DMCA is susceptible to 
abusive claims.283 Moreover, because private parties, such as service 
providers, remove the content, the DMCA evades the level of scrutiny 
typically evoked by government intervention.284 Professor Seltzer 
                                                            
278. See Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression et al., Joint 
Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet, § 2b, available at http://
www.osce.org/fom/78309 (June 1, 2011) [hereinafter Joint Declaration]. 
279. Some other notice-and-action systems, such as the E-Commerce Directive, do not 
include counter-notifications. See supra notes  176-81 (describing the E-Commerce notice-
and-action procedure). 
280. See Seltzer, supra note 117, at 116 (arguing that the DMCA's indirect chilling effect 
upon speech affects the public no less than if the government wrongly ordered the removal of 
lawful online material directly); John William Nelson, DMCA Takedowns Versus Free Speech, 
LEX TECHNOLOGIAE (October 18, 2010) http://www.lextechnologiae.com/2010/10/18/dmca-
takedowns-versus-free-speech/ (discussing how legitimate works can be brought down by 
illegitimate DMCA take-down notices because service providers are likely to be risk-averse). 
281. See Doble, supra note 120 (reporting the suspected use of DMCA takedowns by 
terrorist organizations); Tamburro, supra note 120 (reporting that a Youtuber is hiding from 
suspected terrorists after sharing his information pursuant to the DMCA counter-notification 
procedures). 
282. See Nelson, supra note 281 (arguing that the DMCA framework of prior restraint is 
inconsistent with the United States’ notion of free expression); Seltzer, supra note 116, at 190 
(arguing for greater constitutional scrutiny of the DMCA because it operates as a prior restraint 
on expression). See generally Internet Intermediaries, supra note 18 (recommending 
improvements to the current notice-and-takedown regime). 
283. See Seltzer, supra note 116, at 178 (“Compounding the problem, the promise of 
rapid takedown creates an incentive for copyright claimants to file dubious takedown claims”); 
Urban & Quilter, supra note 116, at 624 (2006) (revealing a high incidence of questionable 
uses of the § 512 process). 
284. See Mike Masnick, Why The DMCA Is An Unconstitutional Restriction On Free 
Speech, TECHDIRT (Apr. 6, 2010), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100402/
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notes that the DMCA offers service providers the one-sided choice of 
either potentially costly, case-by-case risk analysis of defending each 
claim or streamlined self-censorship.285 She posits that a rational, risk-
averse entity would likely choose the latter, especially since 
potentially only a third party’s speech is at stake.286 This risk-aversion 
may surrender valuable speech in the process.287 
In an effort to study § 512 of the DMCA’s effect on the First 
Amendment, a consortium of law school clinics and the EFF began 
the “Chilling Effects Project.”288 Beginning in January 2002, the 
project collected cease-and-desist letters on a “variety of intellectual 
property and other online-speech-related doctrines such as 
defamation.”289 Their study revealed takedowns occurring in 
numerous questionable situations.290 For instance, a number of notices 
addressed non-copyright issues, such as a competitor’s search engine 
ranking, trademark rights, or personal privacy.291 The researchers 
determined from their limited data that the effect on Internet speech 
                                                                                                                                     
1856128861.shtml (arguing that the DMCA violates the First Amendment); Seltzer, supra note 
116, at 175-76 (arguing for greater constitutional scrutiny of § 512 because its “indirect 
chilling effect upon speech harms the public no less than if the government wrongly ordered 
the removal of lawful online material directly.”). 
285. See Seltzer, supra note 116, at 175 (arguing that the DMCA incentivizes streamline 
censorship).  
286. See id.  
287. See May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 52, at 12 (noting intermediaries’ 
inclination to err on the side of safety by over-censoring potentially illegal content); Seltzer, 
supra note 116, at 184 (arguing that the market fails to correct this error because a significant 
amount of Internet speech is non-commercial and hosted on free or low-margin hosting 
services).  
288. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 15, at 641; CHILLING EFFECTS http://
www.chillingeffects.org (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) [hereinafter CHILLING EFFECTS PROJECT] 
(describing the goals of the organization, which is to educate people about the protections that 
the First Amendment and intellectual property laws give to your online activities). 
289. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 115, at 641. Their data set included 876 notices 
submitted to Chilling Effects over a three year period; see also About Us, CHILLING EFFECTS, 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2015), https://www.chillingeffects.org/pages/about (discussing the aims of 
the project). 
290. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 115, at 681 (finding a surprisingly large number of 
notices that present serious substantive questions about the underlying claim); see also About 
Us, CHILLING EFFECTS, (last visited Apr. 5, 2015), https://www.chillingeffects.org/pages/
about (discussing that many notices are without merit). 
291. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 115, at 681 (finding the data quite troubling, since 
the legislative history of § 512 were limited to questions of copyright infringement); see also  
CHILLING EFFECTS http://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (containing a 
database of improper takedown complaints, including notices based on trademarks). 
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from processes that lack the traditional safeguards of court 
proceedings is rather significant.292  
B. Article 19 Analysis of the United Kingdom: Who Watches the 
Watchdogs? 
Special Rapporteur Frank La Rue recognized that an 
organization that is independent of any unwarranted influence may 
undertake assessment of  blocking sites as long as the entity provides 
full details regarding the necessity and justification for the 
censorship.293 Because the IWF does not directly censor content, 
however, it is unclear based on the language of Article 19 whether the 
three-part cumulative test applies to the UK government’s 
cooperation with the IWF because the IWF does not promulgate laws 
or regulations, and the three-part cumulative test appears to apply 
only to laws.294 Because the IWF’s “URL list” affects over 95% of 
UK Internet users, transparency and accountability are essential from 
that institution.295 Not only is the IWF’s “URL list” confidential, but 
the IWF also does not publish its findings from its independent 
review process.296 A party that receives a notice to takedown or 
discovers that its site has been added to the “URL list” may appeal the 
IWF’s assessment to the internal appeal board.297 Because the IWF is 
                                                            
292. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 115, at 682 (arguing that the removal of speech 
from the Internet without traditional forms of due process is troubling); see also Brief of 
Amicus Curiae for Plaintiff-Appellant at 26, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (No. 10-56316) (referencing the symposium’s findings). 
293. See May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 52, at 20 (calling for increased 
transparency in filtering); August 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 51 at 13 (discussing the 
possibility of independent organizations in determining what material should be blocked). 
294. See May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 52, at 8 (stating that any limitation to the 
right to freedom of expression must be provided by law, which is clear and accessible to 
everyone); August 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 51, at 22 (emphasis added) (“Any such 
laws must comply with the three criteria of restrictions . . . .”).  
295. See Dawn C. Nunziato, The Beginning of the End of Internet Freedom, 45 Geo. J. 
Int'l L. 383, 389 (2014) (noting that the United Kingdom has implemented a nationwide 
filtering system that affects over 98% of Internet subscribers in the country); CJ Davies, The 
Hidden Censors of the Internet, WIRED UK (May 20, 2009), http://www.wired.co.uk/
magazine/archive/2009/06/features/the-hidden-censors-of-the-Internet/viewall (reporting that 
reach of the IWF’s blacklist on UK Internet subscribers.) 
296. See Edwards, supra note 159 (noting that the IWF does not publish its URL list). 
297. See Content Assessment Appeal Process, INTERNET WATCH FOUND., https://
www.iwf.org.uk/accountability/complaints/content-assessment-appeal-process (last visited 
Dec. 31, 2014) (describing IWF’s internal appeal process); Content Assessment Appeal 
Process: Chart, INTERNET WATCH FOUND., https://www.iwf.org.uk/assets/media/
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a non-government organization, however, there is no judicial appeal 
of the determinations made within the organization.298  
 The IWF’s “URL list,” at least facially, does not create a 
freedom of expression concern because the organization ostensibly 
only compiles a blacklist of criminal content, such as child 
pornography. Moreover, the Special Rapporteur underscores that 
there is a difference between blocking illegal content, which States 
parties are required to prohibit under international law, and content 
that may be considered harmful, but of which State parties are neither 
required to prohibit nor criminalize.299 However, despite the IWF’s 
limited involvement in the actual censoring of illegal content, the UK 
filtering system essentially grants the ultimate authority over Internet 
content to this unaccountable, nontransparent organization.300 
The 2008 “IWF and Wikipedia” controversy demonstrated the 
possible over-inclusive censorship resulting from major UK ISPs 
utilizing the IWF’s “URL list.”301 On December 5, 2008, the IWF 
added Wikipedia URLs for “Virgin Killer,” the 1976 album by 
German heavy metal band Scorpions, to their blacklist.302 The thirty-
                                                                                                                                     
accountability/Content%20assessment%20appeal%20process.pdf (flowchart of IWF appeal 
process). 
298. See Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, A Human Rights Audit of the Internet Watch 
Foundation, https://www.iwf.org.uk/assets/media/accountability/Human_Rights_Audit_
web.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (recommending that, based on the rationale in the split 
decision of the United Kingdom Supreme Court case YL v. Birmingham City Council, IWF’s 
assessments should be susceptible to judicial review); see also Davies, supra note 95 
(describing IWF’s opaque internal appeals process). 
299. See August 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 51, at 7 (differentiating content that 
must be prohibited by international law and permissible content). See generally Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child 
Pornography, art. 3(c), opened for signature May 24, 2000, 2171 U.N.T.S. 227 (requiring State 
Parties to criminalize the production and dissemination of child pornography). 
300. Because UK’s largest ISPs utilize the IWF’s URL list, the effect of the blacklist is 
experienced throughout the nation. See IWF URL List Recipients, supra note 158 (providing a 
list of ISPs and telecommunications companies that utilize the URL list); Davies, supra note 
296 (reporting that Internet content in the United Kingdom is checked against a mysterious, 
secret blacklist). 
301. See Davies, supra note 295 (reporting on the Wikipedia controversy); see also infra 
notes 302-09 (explaining the over-censorship of Wikipedia that resulted from the IWF’s URL 
list).  
302. See Frank Fisher, A Nasty Sting in the Censors' Tail, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 
2008), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/dec/09/scorpions-virgin-killer-
censorship (reporting the controversy over the thirty-year-old album cover); Gordon 
MacMillan, Wikipedia Page Banned in UK Over Controversial Child Image, BRAND 
REPUBLIC (Dec. 9, 2008), http://www.brandrepublic.com/news/868067/Wikipedia-page-
banned-UK-controversial-child-image/ (“An Internet watchdog in the UK has taken the 
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two-year-old album cover depicted a nude prepubescent girl.303 The 
IWF justified the inclusion of the sites that showed the album cover 
because the cover contained “potentially illegal child sexual abuse 
image.”304 However, as a result of the block, UK users were unable to 
view the page or edit the Wikipedia article, consequently preventing 
them from removing the picture.305 ISPs utilizing the “URL list” 
would re-route Wikipedia traffic through a proxy server, resulting in 
Wikipedia being unable to distinguish UK users from one another by 
their IP addresses.306 This influx from a single source triggered 
Wikipedia's anti-abuse mechanism, blocking all non-registered UK 
users from editing articles.307 Electronic Frontiers Australia vice-
chairman Colin Jacobs commented that "[the] incident in Britain, in 
which virtually the entire country was unable to edit Wikipedia 
because the [IWF] had blacklisted a single image on the site, 
illustrated the pitfalls of mandatory ISP filtering.”308 Facing a storm 
                                                                                                                                     
unprecedented step of banning users in Britain from accessing a Wikipedia web page, which 
contains an album cover featuring an image of a young nude girl.”); Wikipedia Child Image 
Censored, BBC (Dec. 8, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7770456.stm (“Some volunteers 
who run Wikipedia said it was not for the [IWF] to censor one of the web's most popular 
sites.”). 
303. See Claudine Beaumont & Nicole Martin, Wikipedia Ban Lifted by Internet Watch 
Foundation, THE TELEGRAPH, (Dec. 10, 2008), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/
3700396/Wikipedia-ban-lifted-by-Internet-Watch-Foundation.html (reporting on IWF’s 
decision to lift the Wikipedia ban resulting from the Scorpions’ Virgin Killer album cover); 
Bobbie Johnson, Wikipedia falls foul of British censors, THE GUARDIAN, (Dec. 7, 2008), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2008/dec/08/wikipedia-censorship (reporting on the 
result of IWF’s blacklist of Wikipedia page). 
304.  Wikipedia Child Image Censored, BBC (Dec. 8, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
7770456.stm (detailing the IWF’s response); see supra notes 303 (reporting on the IWF’s 
response to the Wikipedia page).  
305. See Censorship of WP in the UK Dec 2008 Q&A, WIKIMEDIA FOUND., http://
wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Censorship_of_WP_in_the_UK_Dec_2008QA (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2014) (explaining why UK users were unable to edit the Wikipedia page); Jeremy 
Kirk, Wikipedia Article Censored in UK for the First Time, PCWORLD (Dec. 8, 2008), http://
www.pcworld.com/article/155112/wikipedia_censored.html (describing the unintended effects 
of blacklisting a Wikipedia article) . 
306. Since at least ninety-five percent of UK Internet users subscribe to ISPs that utilize 
the IWF’s blacklist, a significant number of UK subscribers were unable to edit the Wikipedia 
page. Jeremy Kirk, Wikipedia Article Censored in UK for the First Time, PCWORLD (Dec. 8, 
2008), http://www.pcworld.com/article/155112/wikipedia_censored.html; see also supra notes 
303-05 (explaining the reason UK users were unable to edit the Wikipedia page).  
307. See supra notes 303-06 (describing inadvertent mass blocking resulting from IWF’s 
blacklist and Wikipedia’s internal mechanisms).  
308. See Asher Moses, Labor Plan to Censor Internet in Shreds, SYDNEY MORNING 
HERALD (Dec. 9, 2008), http://www.smh.com.au/news/home/technology/labor-plan-to-censor-
Internet-in-shreds/2008/12/09/1228584820006.html?page=fullpage#contentSwap1 (reporting 
concerns over Australia’s proposal to adopt an Internet censorship system similar to the IWF); 
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of controversy, the IWF rescinded the block on December 9, 2008 
after conducting its own independent, nontransparent appeal 
process.309  
In efforts to provide accountability and reassure stakeholders, 
the IWF regularly invites independent auditors to inspect the 
organization’s processes.310 In November 2013, Lord Ken Macdonald 
of River Glaven, Director of Public Prosecution, conducted a human 
rights audit of the IWF.311 In his report dated January 27, 2014, Lord 
Macdonald recommended several improvements, such as increasing 
the transparency in the inspection and appeal process.312 The IWF 
adopted seven of the recommendations, including appointing a human 
rights expert on the Board and appointing a senior legal figure as the 
Chief Inspector of the appeals process.313 While these improvements 
would likely improve the IWF processes, the blocking resulting from 
ISPs utilizing the IWF’s URL list continues to be opaque.  
Further, the trend of graduated response laws has prompted 
international attention from human rights scholars.314 Special 
Rapporteur La Rue challenged the legitimacy of graduated response 
laws, declaring that “[c]utting off subscribers from Internet access, on 
                                                                                                                                     
see also Colin Jacobs, The Future of Internet Censorship, ELECTRONIC FRONTIERS 
AUSTRALIA, (Sept. 21, 2010) (referencing the IWF and Wikipedia incident).. 
309. See Jacqui Cheng, IWF Backs off of Scorpions Wikipedia Block After Criticism, 
ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 9, 2008), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2008/12/iwf-backs-off-of-
scorpions-wikipedia-block-after-criticism/ (reporting that “the fact that the image is some 32 
years old and posted pretty much everywhere on the Internet. . . has prompted the IWF to 
remove it from its list of illegal content.”); Richard Korman, British Watchdogs Back Down 
Over Wikipedia Image of Nude Girl, ZDNET (Dec. 9, 2008), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/
government/british-watchdog-backs-down-over-wikipedia-image-of-nude-girl/4214 (reporting 
the IWF’s lift of the ban). 
310. See Independent Inspection, INTERNET WATCH FOUND., https://www.iwf.org.uk/
accountability/independent-inspection (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (providing the public with 
the auditor’s reports); see, e.g., 2013 AUDIT OF THE INTERNET WATCH FOUNDATION (Jul. 19, 
2013), https://www.iwf.org.uk/assets/media/accountability/IWF%20Hotline%20Audit
%202013.pdf (reporting a satisfactory inspection of the IWF’s processes). 
311. See Human Rights Audit, INTERNET WATCH FOUND., 
https://www.iwf.org.uk/accountability/human-rights-audit (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) 
(providing the public with the auditor’s reports) (reporting the adoption of several of Lord 
Macdonald’s recommendations). 
312. See Macdonald, supra note 299, at 25 (“It is critical . . . that IWF’s inspection 
process should be transparent and properly designed). 
313. Human Rights Audit, INTERNET WATCH FOUND., https://www.iwf.org.uk/
accountability/human-rights-audit (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (reporting the adoption of 
several of Lord Macdonald’s recommendations).  
314. See, e.g., May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 53, at 14 (expressing his deep 
concerns over discussions regarding a centralized on/off control over Internet traffic). 
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the grounds of violating intellectual property rights law, is completely 
disproportionate and subsequently a violation of Article 19, Paragraph 
3, of the [ICCPR].”315 The Special Rapporteur urges States Parties to 
repeal or amend existing intellectual copyright laws, which permit 
users to be disconnected from Internet access, and to refrain from 
adopting such laws.316 
Prime Minister Cameron’s proposal of default filtering of legal 
content raises several human rights issues.317 For example, Special 
Rapporteur La Rue noted that “while the protection of children from 
inappropriate content may constitute a legitimate aim, the availability 
of software filters that parents . . . can use to control access to certain 
content renders action by the Government such as blocking less 
necessary and difficult to justify.”318 Similarly, Jim Killock, executive 
director of the Open Rights Group, explains that default filters may 
not be necessary.319 The underlying issue can be addressed by 
increasing funds for the policing of the criminals responsible for the 
production and distribution of images of child abuse.320 While the 
effects of the United Kingdom’s default filter proposal and its 
graduated response law can be analyzed under the traditional Article 
19 analysis, the UK ISP’s cooperation with a nongovernment 
organization muddles the analysis. The narrowed scope of Article 
                                                            
315. Id. at 21.  
316. See id.  
317. See May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 53, at 10 (stating that States’ use of 
blocking or filtering technologies is often in violation of their obligation to guarantee the right 
to freedom of expression); Joint Declaration, supra note 279, at 3 (“Content filtering systems 
which are imposed by a government or commercial service provider and which are not end-
user controlled are a form of prior censorship and are not justifiable as a restriction on freedom 
of expression.”). 
318. May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 53, at 9 (recognizing that advances in 
technology are weakening governments’ justifications for censorship based on protecting 
children from inappropriate content). 
319. See Jim Killock, David Cameron is Issuing Bad Advice to Parents, OPEN RIGHTS 
GROUP BLOG (Jul. 22, 2013) https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2013/porn-blocks-edging-
away-from-active-choice (arguing for that the proposed filters are not feasible); Jim Killock, 
Help us to Re-start the Debate About Internet Filters, OPEN RIGHTS GROUP BLOG (Apr. 15, 
2014), https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2014/help-us-to-restart-the-debate-about-
Internet-filters (launching campaign to raise awareness of the Internet filtering issue). 
320. See Killock, supra note 320 (arguing that mandatory filters are not required to 
protect children); see also Olly Lenard, Why David Cameron's Internet Censorship Is a 
Terrifying and Terrible Idea, HUFFINGTON POST UK BLOG (Jul. 29, 2013, 10: 52 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/olly-lennard/why-david-camerons-intern_b_3653566.html (arguing 
that that Prime Minster Cameron’s proposed filtering measures are ineffective, ill-informed 
and bound to fail).  
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19(3) to laws or actions of the government possibly limits the actions 
and decisions of non-government actors, such as ISPs and the IWF, 
from the purview of the ICCPR.  
C. Article 19 Analysis of China: Examining the “Impregnable 
Fortress” 
China’s policy of Internet censorship has drawn international 
attention and criticism.321 China's content regulation scheme 
comprises a morass of statutes, regulations, and decrees from 
numerous government entities.322 Although China is a signatory to the 
ICCPR, the Chinese government has not ratified the treaty.323 
Establishing the potential violations of Article 19 will illuminate the 
extent of the PRC’s human rights violations, and subsequently 
establish grounds to remedy them. While Article 19(3) permits 
restrictions for the protection of national security, public order, health 
and morals, these restrictions must comply with the three-part 
cumulative test expressed in Article 19(3).324 A closer examination 
reveals that the PRC’s regulation of the Internet suffers from 
vagueness, disproportional sanctions, and lack of transparency.325 
Imprecise language creates difficulty in determining which 
speech is permitted and which are prohibited.326 For instance, the 
Regulation on Publication Administration provides that “no 
                                                            
321. See e.g., supra notes 216-36 (discussing international criticism of PRC’s control 
over their internal Internet activity). 
322. See supra Part I.D.1-2 (discussing the methods and effects of China’s manipulation 
of the Internet). 
323. Signing a treaty is a step towards becoming party to a treaty. See Understanding 
International Law Fact Sheet #5, UNITED NATIONS, https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/events/
2008/Press_kit/fact_sheet_5_english.pdf (“A State can express its consent to be bound in 
several ways . . . the most common ways are: definitive signature, ratification, acceptance, 
approval, and accession.”). 
Simply signing a treaty, however, does not usually make a State a party. Id. Signing 
treaties does, however, create an obligation, in the period between signature and ratification to 
refrain in good faith from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. Id. 
324. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 19(3).  
325. See infra notes 327-58 (describing the vagueness of various regulations, 
disproportional punishment of Internet bloggers and critics, and lack of transparency of the 
Golden Shield Project). 
326. See Mindy Kristin Longanecker, No Room for Dissent: China's Laws Against 
Disturbing Social Order Undermine Its Commitments to Free Speech and Hamper the Rule of 
Law, 18 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 373, 398 (2009) (discussing how laws against disturbing 
social order are vague and leave citizens and officials without proper guidance as to the laws' 
scope); Shao, Internet Speech, supra note 196, at 56-57 (discussing the lack of certainty 
caused by vague laws). 
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publication” may contain content “harming the honor or the interest 
of the nation” and “disturbing social order, disrupting social 
stability.”327 What constitutes honor, national interest, social order, 
and social stability are not defined.328 Furthermore, the 
aforementioned prohibition is also present in numerous statutes such 
as the Criminal Law and Decision on Safeguarding Internet 
Security.329  
In addition, the involvement of various regulatory and licensing 
agencies constitutes a form of prior restraint.330 The GAPP requires 
all proposed publications on “important topics” to be filed with their 
agency.331 The PRC further requires individuals or organizations to 
obtain permits in order to lawfully engage in media business.332 The 
Regulation on Internet Information Service requires all commercial 
                                                            
327. Chuban Guanli Tiaoli (2011 Xiuding) (出版管理条例(2011修订)) [Regulation on 
the Administration of Publication (2011 Revision)] (promulgated by State Council, Mar. 19, 
2011, effective Jul. 18, 2013) (Lawinfochina) (China) (failing to delineate the scope of what 
constitutes “disturb[ing] the public order or destroy[ing] the public stability.”). 
328. See id.; Longanecker, supra note 327, at 399 (noting the lack of definitions of key 
terms in PRC regulations).  
329. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (97 Xiuding) (中华人民共和国刑法 
(97修订)) [Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (97 Revision)] (promulgated by 
National People's Congress, Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1 1997) (Lawinfochina) (China) 
(failing to define the terms); Quanguo Rwn Da Chang Weihuì Guanyu Weihu Hulianwang 
Anquan De Juedìng (全国人大常委会关于维护互联网安全的决定) [Decision of the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Preserving Computer Network 
Security] (promulgated by Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Dec. 28, 
2000, effective Dec. 28, 2000) (Lawinfochina) (China)  (failing to define the terms). 
330. See Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra note 199, at 54-56 (explaining that China’s 
licensing schemes amount to prior restraint); Prior Restraints, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE 
COMMISSION ON CHINA, http://www.cecc.gov/prior-restraints (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) 
(listing the various forms of prior restraint in China). 
331. These topics include: literature of the Party or the nation, former or current leaders 
of the Party or the nation, Party secrets or state secrets, nationality problems or religious 
problems, the Cultural Revolution, the former Soviet Union, and Eastern European bloc. See 
[Guanyu Yinfa Tushu Qikan Yinxiang Zhipin Dianzi Chubanwu Zhongda Xuan Tili Beian 
Banfa De 
Tongzhi(关于印发(图书、期刊、音像制品、电子出版物重大选题备案办法)
的通知) [Measures on the Recording of Important Topics of Books, Periodicals, 
Audio/Visual Productions and Electronic Publications]promulgated by the General Office of 
the General Administration of Press, October 10, 1997, effective October 10, 1997), 
http://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/circular-regarding-the-printing-and-
promulgation-of-the-measures-on-the#body-chinese (China); see also Shao, Regulating the 
Internet, supra note 199, at 55 (describing the GAPP’s licensing procedures). 
332. See, e.g., Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa (互联网信息服务管理办法) 
[Regulation on Internet Information Service] (promulgated by the State Council, Sept. 25, 
2000, effective Jan. 8, 2011) (Lawinfochina) (China) (requiring individuals to obtain a license 
before engaging in the media business). 
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and non-commercial Internet information services to file with their 
local telecommunications regulatory authority.333 Similarly, the 
Administration of the Publication of Audio-Visual Programs 
stipulates that no one may operate an Internet broadcast business for 
news-related audio/visual programs without permission from the State 
Council Information Office.334 Consequently, the Chinese 
government controls the amount, structure, distribution, and 
coordination of publishing and broadcasting within the country.335  
Vague language and overbreadth are legal comorbidities.336 
Numerous regulations become over-inclusive and prohibit an 
expansive set of activities by using imprecise language.337 For 
instance, the Regulations on the Administration of Business Sites of 
Internet Access Services proscribes that no unit or individual may 
utilize the Internet to produce, copy, look up, or transmit information 
“damaging the interest of the state.”338 This statute ostensibly 
prohibits the use of the Internet to criticize the Chinese 
                                                            
333. See id. 
334. Hulianwang Deng Xinxi Wangluo Chuanbo Shi Jiemu Guanli Banfa 
(互联网等信息网络传播视听节目管理办法) [Measures for the Administration of the 
Publication of Audio-Visual Programs through the Internet] (promulgated by State 
Broadcasting, Film and TV Administration, July 6 2004, effective Oct. 11, 2004) 
(Lawinfochina) (China) (“The License for Publication of Audio-Visual Programs through 
Information Network shall be obtained for undertaking the business of publication of audio-
visual programs through information network.”).  
335. See Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra note 200, at 55 (describing the PRC’s 
control over publishing and broadcasting). In addition to licensing and reporting schemes, the 
Chinese government also proactively takes down search engines, online chat rooms and blog 
service providers. See Raymond Li and Kristine Kwok, Popular Forum Rushes to Go Offline 
After Closure Order, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Jul. 26, 2006), http://www.scmp.com/
article/558028/popular-forum-rushes-go-offline-after-closure-order (reporting that a popular 
online forum has been ordered to shut down after mainland authorities began tightening their 
grip on the Internet). 
336. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 857 
(1991) (arguing that vagueness is best analyzed as a subcategory of overbreadth and that 
overbreadth principles should govern vagueness issues); Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra 
note 202, at 57 (noting that vagueness and overbreadth are often overlapping). 
337. See Longanecker, supra note 327, at 399 (noting that when the laws present 
ambiguous terms without any guidance for government officials or citizens, Chinese police 
and courts interpret these terms inconsistently); Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra note 200, 
at 57 (explaining that vague laws risk selective enforcement and may proscribe a broad range 
of activities). 
338. Hulianwang Shangwang Fuwu Yingye Changsuo Guanli Tiaoli 
(互联网上网服务营业场所管理条例) [Regulations on the Administration of Business Sites 
of Internet Access Services] (promulgated by State Council, Sept. 29, 2002, effective Nov. 15, 
2002) (Lawinfochina) (China), art. 14 (prohibiting the use of the Internet to harm the social 
ethics or the excellent cultural traditions of the nationalities).  
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government.339 While the Supreme People's Court and Supreme 
People's Procuratorate have issued various interpretation guidelines, 
this does not solve the underlying problem of vague regulations and 
instead only amounts to a short fix to a deeper problem.340 
The government’s control over the Internet is further reinforced 
by the installation of the Great Firewall of China.341 The firewall 
raises numerous potential Article 19 violations, including preventing 
citizens from receiving and seeking information.342 For instance, a 
search for “Human Rights Watch” on a Chinese ISP will return an 
error page.343 Unlike other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, where 
blocked content is redirected to a page explaining the reason why the 
content is blocked, access to restricted content in China only informs 
the user that “connection was reset.”344 Therefore, intentional 
censorship is difficult to distinguish from a technical error.345 
The PRC recently increased surveillance of Internet activity, 
specifically microblogs, which are more concise and thematic 
versions of traditional blogs.346 The threat of harsh sanctions can exert 
                                                            
339. See id. 
340. See 2010 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 210 (attempting to give guidance to 
government officials regarding the scope of pornography laws); Longanecker, supra note 327, 
at 399 (arguing that in order restore legitimacy of certain laws, China needs to address the 
vague terminology). 
341. See Lyombe Eko, Anup Kumar & Qingjiang Yao, Google This: The Great Firewall 
of China, the It Wheel of India, Google Inc., and Internet Regulation, 15 J. INTERNET L. 3, 5 
(2011) (“The Great Firewall Wall of China is a massive, sophisticated, national censorship 
system that uses a number of techniques . . . to automatically control and restrict the stream of 
Internet communication entering or leaving China . . . .”); Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra 
note 200, at 43 (explaining China’s use of a variety of technical measures to filter content). 
342. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 19(1)(2). 
343. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 391 (explaining China’s lack of 
openness regarding their use of filters); “Race to the Bottom” Corporate Complicity in 
Chinese Internet Censorship, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Aug. 2006, Vol. 8 No. 8, 10-11 
[hereinafter Race to the Bottom] (describing the extent of the PRC’s control over the Internet 
at the router-level). 
344. Race to the Bottom, supra note 343, at 11 (discussing that governments differ in 
their attempts to inform the Internet user about blocked content); see Bambauer, Cybersieves, 
supra note 21, at 391-92 (juxtaposing the openness of Saudi Arabia’s use of filters with the 
lack of openness of Great Firewall of China); Alfred Hermida, Saudis Block Two Thousand 
Websites, BBC (Jul. 31, 2002) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/2153312.stm (reporting 
that the Saudis are also open about their censorship of the web). 
345. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 391 (noting that intentional 
censorship is difficult to distinguish from technical errors); Race to the Bottom, supra note 
344, at 10 (explaining the China’s filters causes an error message to appear in the users’ 
browser when they searched for blocked content). 
346. See Chen, supra note 20, at 250 (discussing the extent of Internet monitoring in 
China); China Employs Two Million Microblog Monitors State Media Say, BBC (Oct. 4, 
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a significant chilling effect on the right to freedom of expression.347 
China currently leads the word in number of arrested Internet users, 
coined “netizens.”348 Among the current prisoners are a Nobel Peace 
Prize winner and number of human rights activists.349  
On January 31, 2005, Changsha’s prosecutorial office, the 
People’s Procuratorate of Changsha, Hunan, filed charges against Shi 
Tao for illegally providing state secrets outside the country.350 Shi 
Tao was the head of the Editorial Department of Hunan’s 
Contemporary Business News and used his personal Yahoo! e-mail 
account to send allegedly top-secret documents to the Asia 
Democracy Foundation, a website located in New York that 
advocates for democracy in China.351 Shi Tao was sentenced to ten 
years imprisonment with two years of subsequent deprivation of 
political rights.352 This case garnered worldwide attention because an 
American corporation, Yahoo!, aided in Shi Tao’s arrest by willingly 
disclosing details of Shi Tao’s email to the Chinese government.353  
                                                                                                                                     
2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-24396957 (reporting the expansion of 
China’s Internet monitoring task force).  
347. See John D. Zelezny, COMMUNICATION LAW: LIBERTIES, RESTRAINT AND 
MODERN MEDIA 50-51 (6th ed. 2011) (explaining that subsequent punishment may chill 
expression as much as prior restraints); Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra note 200, at 56 
(noting that when punishment is overly harsh, the prospects of subsequent sanctions may serve 
to chill expression as much as prior orders not to publish). 
348. See Internet Enemies 2012 – China, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 12, 2012) 
https://en.rsf.org/china-china-12-03-2012,42077.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (reporting 
the waves of blogger and “netizen” arrests); see also China Arrests Blogger for Twitter Joke, 
THE GUARDIAN, (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/21/china-
arrest-blogger-twitter-joke (reporting an arrest of a Chinese Twitter user for making jokes 
about the Chinese Congress).    
349. Liu Xiaobo, a professor, Nobel Peace Prize laureate, and human rights activist, is 
currently incarcerated as a political prisoner in China. See Mark Mcdonald, An Inside Look at 
China’s Most Famous Political Prisoner, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Jul. 23, 2012) http://
rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/23/an-inside-look-at-chinas-most-famous-political-
prisoner/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (reporting about Liu Xiaobo’s sentence for seeking 
democractic reforms); Internet Enemies 2011 – China, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (March 11, 
2011) available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d822690c.html (Reporting on human rights 
activist, Hu Jia’s, sentence for inciting subversion of state power).  
350. See Shi Tao (Hunan Province, Changsha Intermediate People’s Ct. 2003) [April 27, 
2005], available at http://www.globalvoicesonline.org/wp-content/ShiTao_verdict.pdf (finding 
that defendant Shi Tao intentionally and illegally provided information that he knew to be top-
secret level state secrets to an entity outside of the country); Shao, Internet Speech, supra note 
196, at 79-82 (summarizing the Shi Tao case). 
351. See supra note 350 (describing the Shi Tao case). 
352. Id. 
353. See Shyu, supra note 224, at 228 (“Because he sent the email from his Yahoo! 
account, China requested, and Yahoo! Hong Kong delivered, information on Shi Tao's 
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Moreover, the reported treatment of political prisoners may also 
cause a chilling effect on speech.354 For instance, cyber-dissident 
Zhang Jianhong, better known under his pen name Li Hong, died of 
complications from a disease that was untreated during three years in 
prison for writing articles critical of the Chinese government.355 The 
incarceration of bloggers and cyber-dissidents clearly runs afoul with 
proportionality principles of Article 19.356  
The analysis in Part II demonstrates that Article 19 is not 
adequate to tackle the modern challenges presented by the 
government. US and UK intellectual property laws present collateral 
effects on expression that are not easily analyzed under Article 19. 
Moreover, it is also unclear about Article 19’s scope vis-à-vis the 
active role of nongovernment organization in the Internet censorship. 
However, an Article 19 analysis is clearest when dealing with a 
totalitarian government, such as the PRC. 
III. ARTICLE 19 NEEDS HELP TO STAY RELEVANT IN THE 
INTERNET AGE 
While the HRC’s interpretations helps to construe the scope of 
Article 19, the margin of discretion that is potentially accorded to 
nations exemplifies the difficulty of analyzing countries with 
                                                                                                                                     
location.”); Undermining Freedom of Expression in China, AMNESTY INT’L, (July 2006), 
http://www.ethicsworld.org/corporatesocialresponsibility/PDF%20links/Amnesty.pdf 
(reporting on the treatment of Shi Tao and his family by the government). 
354. See Mayton, supra note 11, at 253-54 (explaining how subsequent punishment may 
chill freedom of expression); Zelezny, supra note 348, at 50-51 (describing the effects of 
subsequent punishment on speech). 
355. See Zhang Jianhong (Pen Name: Li Hong), PEN AMERICA, http://www.pen.org/
defending-writers/test-first-name-test-middle-name-test-last-name/zhang-jianhong-pen-name-
li-hong (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (“Zhang Jianhong’s condition worsened considerably due 
to a prolonged lack of medical care, and repeated applications for medical parole were denied 
despite his declining health.”); Richard Finney, Cyber-Dissident Dies on Parole, RADIO FREE 
ASIA (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/dissident-01052011131836.html 
(“An outspoken Chinese cyber-dissident has died after suffering from an untreated medical 
condition in jail, according to friends.”). 
356. See UN General Comment 34, supra note 51 (requiring State to invoke a legitimate 
ground in order to restrict the right to freedom of expression); May 2011 La Rue Report, supra 
note 52, at 11 (affirming Human Rights Council declaration that restrictions should never be 
applied, inter alia, to discussion of Government policies and political debate, and reporting on 
human right). 
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divergent laws and norms.357 This difficulty created by transnational 
norms is further exacerbated when the Internet is involved. 
Moreover, although Article 19 was drafted with the foresight to 
accommodate future technology, the Internet has developed into a 
phenomenon that cannot be adequately governed by traditional media 
laws.358 For instance, the absolute language in Article 19, Paragraph 
2, can lead to possible conflicts for countries that are also parties to 
the WIPO Treaty and the Berne Convention.359 While these 
international copyright agreements do not explicitly require 
implementing a notice-and-action regime, numerous governments 
have adopted this type of intermediary liability system.360 This 
growing trend of intermediary liability has caused the Special 
Rapporteurs and the HRC to recognize that current notice-and-action 
systems are likely incompatible with Article 19.361 
In order to adapt international human rights law to the new 
challenges presented by the Internet, Article 19 should be 
supplemented by parts of Professor Bambauer’s process-based 
framework delineated in Cybersieves. This metric utilizes normative 
criterion for analyzing a censorship system: openness, narrowness, 
transparency, and accountability.362 Although Article 19 already 
incorporates similar principles, the enumerated principles only 
establish baseline rights and a positive duty for State members to 
promote access to the Internet.363  
                                                            
357. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Hertzberg Commc’n, supra note 238 (“There is no 
universally applicable common standard. Consequently, in this respect, a certain margin of 
discretion must be accorded to the responsible national authorities.”); Legg, supra note 242, at 
141 (“One of the most powerful criticisms of the margin of appreciation doctrine is that it 
panders to relativist notions of human rights law, which ought to be universal.”). 
358. See May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 53, at 8 (emphasizing that due to the 
unique characteristics of the Internet, regulations which may be deemed legitimate for 
traditional media are often not so with regard to the Internet). 
359. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 19(2). 
360. See supra notes 113-19 (discussing the DMCA); supra notes 176-81 (discussing the 
E-Commerce Directive). 
361. See generally Joint Declaration, supra note 279, § 2(a-b) (declaring that no one 
“should be liable for content generated by others, which is disseminated using those services, 
as long as they do not specifically intervene in that content or refuse to obey a court order to 
remove that content, where they have the capacity to do so”); May 2011 La Rue Report, supra 
note 53, at 11 (noting that intermediary liability systems are subject to abuse). 
362. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 390-411 (establishing the 
framework). 
363. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 19.  
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As demonstrated by the limited HRC cases, the protection of 
these rights is muddled by divergent norms and values.364 Unlike the 
text of Article 19, an analysis under the framework does not rely 
solely on asking why a country regulates Internet content, for which 
there are possibly infinite reasons, but instead the framework asks 
how the country regulates the Internet.365 Moreover, because the 
metric encompasses culturally-neutral normative values, 
incorporating these aims will improve the analysis of different 
countries’ Internet governance. The metric essentially converts 
abstract principles into concrete, measurable evaluations.  
The first criterion is openness. The framework looks to whether 
the country admits to the filtering and clearly describes the 
justifications for such filters.366 In other words, openness assesses 
whether a state discloses why it censors. Censorship that is disclosed 
and explained is likely to be seen as more legitimate than covert 
censorship.367 Openness is readily achievable with the current state of 
filters.368 For instance, Saudi Arabia’s Internet filters redirect blocked 
content to a webpage that informs the Internet user about the 
country’s censorship policy.369  
The second criterion is transparency. While transparency and 
openness are concomitant, transparency relates to the opacity of the 
specific content that is filtered and the criteria that the government 
uses to delineate prohibited content from permissible content.370 
Transparent filtering allows end-users to assess how the blacklist 
                                                            
364. See supra notes 237-41 (discussing the HRC’s lack of progress in respects to 
freedom of expression cases). 
365. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 390 (describing that the goal of the 
framework is to evaluate how well a country describes what it censors). 
366. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 390 (explaining the openness 
criterion); Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 900-06 (analyzing specific soft 
censorship models under the Framework). 
367. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 390-92 (discussing the standard of 
openness); see also Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 900-01 (discussing the 
general lack of openness of soft censorship resulting from government persuasion). 
368. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 392 (discussing that current filtering 
technology can display a block page when a user is prevented from accessing banned 
material); Saudi Internet Rules, supra note 246 (proscribing specific Internet activities and 
content). 
369. See Race to the Bottom, supra note 344, at 11 (noting that attempting to access 
blocked webpages in Saudi Arabia will redirect users to an information page); Saudi Internet 
Rules, supra note 246 (notifying users of the prohibited content). 
370. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 393 (explaining the transparency 
criterion); Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 902-03 (discussing the lack of 
transparency in soft censorship methods). 
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conforms to the government's justifications for information control.371 
Moreover, the transparency criterion can also apply to copyright laws. 
For instance, a transparent notice-and-action system discloses its 
criteria and publicly records its notices. Despite Article 19’s similar 
requirements of openness and transparency, the framework provides 
for a more detailed, concrete guideline for analyzing a system’s 
openness and transparency. 
The third criterion, narrowness, analyzes the accuracy of what a 
country actually blocks to the government's description of its 
censorship.372 Narrowness examines both over-inclusiveness and 
under-inclusiveness censorship.373 Over-inclusive censorship can be 
deliberate or inadvertent.374 For instance, inadvertent filtering can 
result from classification errors.375 The Golden Shield Project, on the 
other hand, exemplifies deliberate over-inclusive censorship because 
it utilizes sophisticated content-filtering technology that purportedly 
blocks any websites containing selected keywords.376  
Under-inclusive censorship occurs when users can routinely 
reach banned content.377 The CleanFeed system is an example of 
under-inclusive filters because the CleanFeed system utilizes the 
IWF’s URL list, which requires regular updates from citizen 
reports.378 Consequently, the filters are a step behind the creators of 
illegal content. Some argue that under-inclusiveness harms the 
                                                            
371. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 393 (discussing the transparency 
criterion); Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 902-03 (discussing the lack of 
transparency in soft censorship methods). 
372. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 396 (detailing the narrowness 
criterion); Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 903-06 (arguing that soft 
censorship methods also typically fare poorly on the narrowness criterion). 
373. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 396-401 (discussing over and under-
inclusive censorship); Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 903-06 (discussing how 
soft-censorship methods can be either over and under-inclusive). 
374. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 397 (giving examples of over-
inclusive censorship); Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 903-06 (discussing the 
effects of inadvertent over-inclusive soft-censorship methods). 
375. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 397 (discussing examples of 
inadvertent over-inclusive filtering). 
376. See supra notes 216-27 (discussing the rationale behind implementing the Great 
Firewall of China). 
377. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 396-99 (giving examples of under-
inclusive censorship); Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 903-06 (arguing that 
various forms of soft censorship models can also be under-inclusive). 
378. See supra notes 150-64 (explaining the IWF process and the CleanFeed 
mechanism). 
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legitimacy of the Internet censorship regime.379 For instance, during 
the IWF-Wikipedia incident, one of the leading criticisms of the IWF 
was that the blocked album cover could be accessed elsewhere on the 
Internet.380 Because of the constant advancement of technology and 
the continual growth of the Internet’s seemingly endless expanse, 
however, moderate levels of under-inclusiveness is to be expected, 
and should be tolerated. 
The inclusion of the narrowness metric to the current Article 19 
analysis will also allow for a clearer understanding of the chilling 
effects caused by copyright laws. For instance, by collecting and 
examining empirical data of a notice-and-action system, auditors will 
be able to determine the accuracy of a system’s process and 
extrapolate inferences about its effect on Internet speech.381  
The final criterion is accountability, which takes into account the 
degree that citizens influence censorship policy.382 Accountability is 
further divided into citizen participation, specification of authority, 
opportunity to challenge, and counter-majoritarian constraints.383 This 
criterion creates problems when applied to non-democratic countries. 
The sub-prongs are intrinsically tied to democratic ideals and, as a 
result, a positive analysis of the final criterion relies heavily on 
whether the country is democratic.384 Professor Bambauer offers 
Saudi Arabia, a monarchy, as a counterexample by referencing the 
                                                            
379. See, e.g., Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 398-99 (“filtering that fails to 
block forbidden material--especially badly flawed or nominal blocking--undercuts the 
justification for restricting access.”); Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 904-05 
(discussing the failure of New York Governor Cuomo’s persuasion-based soft-censorship).  
380. See supra notes 301-09 (describing the IWF-Wikipedia incident). 
381. See, e.g., Urban & Quilter, supra note 116, at 624 (describing efforts from different 
organizations on gathering information on notice-and-takedown requests and examining the 
data); CHILLING EFFECTS PROJECT, supra note 289 (studying cease and desist letters 
concerning online content). 
382. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 400 (discussing the accountability 
criterion); Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 927 (discussing that while SOPA 
and PIPA fare poorly on the other criterion, the acts of Congress score well on the 
accountability criterion). 
383. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 400-01 (discussing the accountability 
criterion). 
384.  Experts have regarded accountability and citizen participation as key elements of a 
democratic society. See, e.g., August 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 52 (noting that civic 
participation is conducive to a democratic society); Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 
404-10 (discussing how several select nondemocratic countries fail at several aspects of 
accountability). 
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country’s citizen participation in Internet censorship. 385 However, 
because of the limited political participation in the country, Saudi 
Arabia fares poorly on the remaining sub-prongs, such as opportunity 
to challenge and counter-majoritarian restraints. While accountability 
is important, imposing democratic virtues on non-democratic 
governments is counter-productive. Non-democratic State parties will 
likely fare poorly in the accountability analysis, and requiring those 
governments to adhere to democratic ideals may be seen as attempts 
at undermining the nation’s sovereignty. This Note is not arguing that 
non-democratic governments are intrinsically incompatible with the 
accountability criterion; rather that the international community 
should not impose the aforementioned democratic principles on 
countries that are not ready to transition into a democracy. For these 
reasons, accountability should be the least weighed factor.  
Furthermore, Professor Bambauer is correct to recognize that a 
framework is only as useful as its implementation.386 In order to 
determine the weight given to each criterion, he argues that 
competition between public and private stakeholders is most efficient 
method to develop the most efficient version of the framework.387 
Professor Bambauer further argues that while there are other means of 
implementation, such as collaboration between stakeholders, and a 
top-down process, they present various challenges.388 For instance, 
collaboration between parties may lead to gridlock or conflicts of 
interest, while a top-down implementation may unintentionally 
promote the stakeholder’s concept on free expression.389  
Despite Professor Bambauer’s reservation on designating the 
implementation process to a single entity, this Note argues that top-
down implementation can be more expedient, efficient, and neutral 
than the other methods with the correct stakeholder. Since the HRC is 
                                                            
385. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 404 (referencing Saudi Arabia as a 
country that permits only limited political participation but invites citizen participation in 
respect to Internet censorship). 
386. Id. at 410 (recognizing the importance of effective implementation for the 
possibility of the framework’s success). 
387.  Id. at 414 (arguing that with competition, proposed metrics should get better and 
fewer over time). 
388. As the name suggests, the collaborative models involve various stakeholders 
collaborating on the implementation of the framework. Id. at 416-17 (describing the 
collaborative model). The top-down model involves a powerful stakeholder to press for the 
framework’s adoption. Id. at 416-17 (discussing the top-down model).  
389. Id. at 416-17 (explaining the various defects of each alternative models of 
implementing the metric). 
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an independent organization comprised of individuals from various 
countries and recognized for their human rights achievements, it is a 
capable organization to develop and adopt the framework.390 
Moreover, the HRC is already tasked with the analytic review of 
reports and releases observations based on its findings.391  
CONCLUSION 
Each country’s method of Internet censorship is to an extent 
different and idiosyncratic.392 The United States relies heavily on 
removing content through private action.393 The United Kingdom, on 
the other hand, cooperates with a non-government organization to 
formulate a blacklist.394 Lastly, China exercises unilateral domination 
over its internal Internet activity.395 The process of supplementing 
Article 19 with Professor Bambauer’s framework arguably will 
provide the HRC and the global community with more concrete and 
defined normative aims for their Internet regulatory practice. This is a 
step towards a global standard for Internet regulation. 
                                                            
390. See Carlson, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing the roles and capabilities of the HRC); 
Monitoring Civil and Political Rights, supra note 36 (describing the role of the HRC); HRC 
Fact Sheet 15, supra note 44, at 12-14 (describing the HRC’s role). 
391. See Carlson, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing the HRC’s compliance mechanisms); 
HRC Fact Sheet 15, supra note 44, at 14-30 (describing the HRC’s monitoring function). 
392. See supra Part I.B-D (examining different country’s Internet censorship schemes). 
393. See supra Part I.B (examining the United States’ legislative-based model). 
394. See supra Part I.C (examining the United Kingdom’s Internet governance model). 
395. See supra Part I.D (examining China’s extensive regulation of the Internet). 
